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Even though most American retirees benefit from Medicare coverage, a 
mounting body of research predicts that many will face large and increasing out-of-
pocket expenditures for healthcare costs in retirement and that many already 
struggle to finance these costs. It is unclear, however, whether the general 
population understands the likely magnitude of these out-of-pocket expenditures well 
enough to plan for them effectively. This study is the first comprehensive 
examination of Americans’ expectations regarding their out-of-pocket spending on 
healthcare in retirement. We surveyed over 1700 near retirees and retirees to assess 
their expectations regarding their own spending and then compared their responses 
to experts’ estimates. Our main findings are twofold. First, overall expectations of 
out-of-pocket spending are mixed. While a significant proportion of respondents 
estimated out-of-pocket costs in retirement at or above expert estimates of what the 
typical retiree will spend, a disproportionate number estimated their future spending 
substantially below what experts view as likely. Estimates by members of some 
demographic subgroups, including women and younger respondents, deviated 
relatively further from the experts’ estimates. Second, respondents consistently 
misjudged spending uncertainty. In particular, respondents significantly 
underestimated how much individual health experience and changes in government 
policy can affect individual out-of-pocket spending. We discuss possible policy 
responses, including efforts to improve financial planning and ways to reduce 
unanticipated financial risk through reform of health insurance regulation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Our current system for retiree healthcare relies on seniors to finance a 
significant portion of their own healthcare expenditures in retirement. Even though 
most will benefit from Medicare coverage, Medicare pays for only about 60% of 
retiree healthcare costs1 and, on its own, has no limit on “out-of-pocket” spending 
(premiums and direct payments for cost sharing and uninsured care).2 Supplemental 
insurance is available to cover what Medicare does not, but it can be expensive and 
still leave some coverage gaps.3 Recent studies estimate that the median Medicare 
beneficiary spends about 16% of his or her income on out-of-pocket healthcare 
spending,4 and some spend as much as one-third of their annual income on such 
costs.5  
Retirees’ role in managing healthcare expenditures will only grow as the cost of 
medical care increases, employer-sponsored retiree healthcare disappears, and 
insurance shifts in form from defined benefit to defined contribution. Experts project 
healthcare spending will consume a larger share of retirees’ disposable income,6 as 
much as 50% of post-tax income for some retirees by 2030,7 even without major 
changes to Medicare or Medicaid in response to federal budget constraints.8  
Even under current conditions, prior studies, based on various measures of 
financial distress, show that retirees are already struggling in the face of large, 
uncertain, and increasing out-of-pocket costs,9 but it is unclear why. One reason 
                                                 
1 PAUL FRONSTIN ET AL., EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., NO. 351, ISSUE BRIEF: FUNDING 
SAVINGS NEEDED FOR HEALTH EXPENSES FOR PERSONS ELIGIBLE FOR MEDICARE 3 (2010), available 
at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_12-2010_No351_Savings3.pdf. 
2 Katherine Baicker & Helen Levy, The Insurance Value of Medicare, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1773, 1773 (2012). 
3 FRONSTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 4 (citing variation in Plan F premium amounts across states). 
4 JULIETTE CUBANSKI ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE CHARTBOOK 72 (4th 
ed. 2010) [hereinafter KFF CHARTBOOK].  
5 ELIOT FISHMAN ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, MEDICARE OUT-OF-POCKET COSTS: CAN 
PRIVATE SAVINGS INCENTIVES SOLVE THE PROBLEM? viii (2008) (discussing low-income retirees, 
retirees in fair or poor health, or those over eighty-five years old.).  
6 RICHARD W. JOHNSON & CORINA MOMMAERTS, URBAN INST., RETIREMENT POLICY PROGRAM, 
WILL HEALTHCARE COSTS BANKRUPT AGING BOOMERS? 1-2 (2010) (reporting that by 2040 half of 
adults over sixty-five will spend 19% of income or more on healthcare, up from 10% in 2010); see 
also, e.g., ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH BOS. COLL., No. 8-3, HEALTHCARE 
COSTS DRIVE UP THE NATIONAL RETIREMENT RISK INDEX 4 (2008); Jonathan Gruber & Helen Levy, 
The Evolution of Medical Spending Risk, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 40 (2009). 
7 JOHNSON & MOMMAERTS, supra note 6, at 1-2. 
8 Healthcare spending comprises an increasing share of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
of federal budget dollars. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HEALTH CARE AND THE BUDGET: ISSUES AND 
CHALLENGES FOR REFORM 2-3 (2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ 
ftpdocs/82xx/doc8255/06-21-healthcarereform.pdf. 
9 Studies report savings shortfalls, healthcare costs as exacerbating retirement risk (defined as a 
substantial and detrimental decrease in standard of living) or healthcare costs consuming a large 
portion of household assets. See ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH BOS. COLL., 
NO. 9-7, LONG-TERM CARE COSTS AND THE NATIONAL RETIREMENT RISK INDEX 6 (2009) (including 
long-term care and healthcare in calculations of national retirement risk increased estimates of those 
at risk from 44% to 61% for the overall population); ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., supra note 6, at 5; 
JACK VANDERHEI, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., NO. 10, NOTES: RETIREMENT SAVINGS SHORTFALLS FOR 
TODAY’S WORKERS 2 (2010) (estimating average retirement savings shortfall of over $47,000 per 
individual for both basic living expenses and out-of-pocket healthcare costs, not including nursing 
home and home healthcare costs which, if added, increase the average shortfall by an additional 
$32,000 for the average man and by $46,000 for the average woman); Amy S. Kelley et al., Out-of-
Pocket Spending in the Last Five Years of Life, J. GEN. INTERNAL MED., Sept. 5, 2012, at 4. Some 
studies link healthcare spending to bankruptcy for seniors in particular. See generally JOHNSON & 
MOMMAERTS, supra note 6. Others find the same, looking at the entire population. See David Dranove 
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individuals might be unprepared for retiree healthcare spending could be a failure to 
understand the magnitude of future healthcare costs.10 Awareness of costs is a 
necessary (albeit insufficient) condition of planning for future spending. We know 
Americans care deeply about accessing healthcare when they need it, and studies 
show that anticipated healthcare expenditures motivate savings by the elderly, even 
more than the bequest motive does.11  
It is unclear, however, how much people know about their likely expenditures 
and to what degree ignorance might impede successful retirement planning for some 
individuals. Compared to deciphering credit card terms or mortgage options, 
estimating individual retiree healthcare costs is much more complex, as anyone who 
has tried to puzzle through the options for supplemental coverage knows well. The 
few studies that examine perceptions of some of the components that affect 
spending, such as potential future insurance coverage, suggest confusion exists. For 
example, one study found more workers expect to receive retiree health benefits 
through a current employer than is likely.12 Prior studies suggest that individuals 
have only low to moderate levels of understanding about Medicare, the foundation 
of most Americans’ retiree healthcare.13 Another study reported workers’ projections 
of their total needs for retirement seem not to take healthcare costs into account and, 
despite such an omission, nearly half say they are confident that they will have 
enough money to pay for medical expenses in retirement.14  
Financial literacy research has shown that one driver of inadequate overall 
retirement savings is a knowledge gap15 and that people with more complete 
information16 and adequate financial literacy to interpret that information17 plan 
                                                                                                                      
& Michael L. Millenson, Medical Bankruptcy: Myth Versus Fact, 25 HEALTH AFF. W74, W79 (2006) 
(reporting medical bills as a contributing factor in 17% of bankruptcies); David U. Himmelstein et al., 
Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 
743 (2009) (finding that medical bills contribute to a majority of bankruptcies). Jennifer Prah Ruger 
suggests that these methods for measuring financial insecurity and health expenditures underestimate 
adverse consequences. Jennifer Prah Ruger, An Alternative Framework for Analyzing Financial 
Protection in Health, 9 PLOS MED., no. 8, 2012, at 1, 5. 
10 See, e.g., Jonathan Starkey, Financial Literacy: Health Care’s Big Bite, NEWS J., Nov. 8, 2012, 
http://www.delawareonline.com/article/20111023/BUSINESS10/110230328/Financial-Literacy-
Health-care-s-big-bite?gcheck=1&nclick_check=1; Paul Sullivan, Planning for Retirement: Don’t 
Forget Health Care Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/06/your-
money/planning-for-retirement-dont-forget-health-care-costs.html?pagewanted=all. 
11 Mariacristina De Nardi et al., Why Do the Elderly Save? The Role of Medical Expenses, 118 J. 
POL. ECON. 39, 72-73 (2010) (“[W]e find that out-of-pocket medical expenditures, and the way in 
which they interact with the consumption floor, go a long way toward explaining the elderly’s saving 
decisions and should be accounted for when considering old-age policy reforms.”). 
12 See PAUL FRONSTIN ET AL., EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., NO. 317, ISSUE BRIEF: SAVINGS NEEDED 
TO FUND HEALTH INSURANCE AND HEALTH CARE EXPENSES IN RETIREMENT: FINDINGS FROM A 
SIMULATION MODEL 23 (2008). 
13 See BANKERS LIFE & CASUALTY CO., CTR. FOR SECURE RET., RETIREMENT HEALTHCARE FOR 
MIDDLE-INCOME AMERICANS 18-21 (2012) (showing that middle-age Americans and near retirees are 
largely unaware of the benefits and coverage available in the Medicare program and what is not 
covered, including vision, dental, and most long-term care benefits); Lauren McCormack et al., Health 
Insurance Literacy of Older Adults, 43 J. CONSUMER AFF. 223, 240 (2009).  
14 See RUTH HELMAN ET AL., EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., NO. 355, ISSUE BRIEF: THE 2011 
RETIREMENT CONFIDENCE SURVEY: CONFIDENCE DROPS TO RECORD LOWS, REFLECTING “THE NEW 
NORMAL” 10 (2011). 
15 Annamaria Lusardi, Household Saving Behavior: The Role of Financial Literacy, Information, 
and Financial Education Programs 11-13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
13824, 2008) (describing financial literacy studies that show that lack of information impedes 
financial planning). 
16 E.g., James J. Choi et al., Small Cues Change Savings Choices 2-3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 17843, 2012) (showing use of education about 401k savings limits leads 
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better for retirement. This research has motivated legal reforms to require better 
financial education or disclosure,18 as well as support for regulatory approaches that 
use default rules or incentives to induce people to save more, despite imperfect 
knowledge and financial literacy shortcomings.19 
This study is the first to examine what people understand about their likely 
future healthcare spending, and, impliedly, to what degree ignorance might impede 
retirement planning. We asked over 1700 individuals in the Rand American Life 
Panel, who are approaching or already in retirement, to estimate out-of-pocket 
healthcare expenditures they are likely to face in retirement and compared their 
estimates to experts’ estimates, which we used as benchmarks. We sought to identify 
both whether respondents’ estimates deviated from the experts’ benchmarks and, if 
so, what aspects of respondents’ estimates deviated more or less from these 
benchmarks. Our starting hypothesis was that individual estimates of retiree 
healthcare out-of-pocket costs would, in general, fall well beneath expert estimates. 
We were wrong, at least in some regards.  
Our main findings, reported in Part III, are twofold. First, with respect to 
estimating total out-of-pocket expenditures, we saw a bimodal distribution of 
responses. On one hand, some answers approximated expert benchmarks. Almost 
40% of respondents’ estimates of monthly out-of-pocket expenditures were at or 
above the median expert benchmark for annual out-of-pocket spending.20 
                                                                                                                      
to increased savings for members of a defined-contribution plan of a large technology company); Gopi 
Shah Goda et al., What Will My Account Really Be Worth? An Experiment on Exponential Growth 
Bias and Retirement Saving 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17927, 2012) 
(“[P]roviding income projections along with general plan information and materials assisting people 
through the steps of changing contribution rates resulted in a 29 percent higher probability of a change 
in contributions relative to a control group over a six-month period . . . and increased their annual 
contributions by $85 more than the control group . . . .”). 
17 Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Retirement Planning in the 
United States, 10 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. 517, 523 (2011) (“[I]t appears that financial literacy does 
drive retirement planning”); Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Financial Literacy and 
Retirement Planning: New Evidence from the Rand American Life Panel 19 (Oct. 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with authors) (“By every measure, and in every sample we have examined, we 
conclude that financial literacy is a key determinant of retirement planning.”). 
18 For example, section 1013(g) of the Dodd-Frank Act for Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection calls for the creation of an Office of Financial Protection for Older American with a charge 
that includes research into best practices to educate about long-term savings and planning for 
retirement and long-term care. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered 
sections of U.S.C.). Governmental agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services, 
have invested in improving financial and health literacy. ELIZABETH FRENTZEL ET AL., AM. INSTS. 
FOR RESEARCH, CONSUMER EDUCATION INITIATIVES IN FINANCIAL AND HEALTH LITERACY 3 (2010) 
(“These challenging times have created an increasing awareness that a lack of financial and health 
literacy can serve as a major barrier to the well-being of individual families and communities . . . a 
number of agencies have attempted to improve financial and health literacy.”).  
19 See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008); John Beshears et al., The 
Importance of Default Options for Retirement Savings Outcomes: Evidence from the United States 6 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12009, 2006) (describing that default enrollment 
in defined-contribution savings plan increases participation in savings plans); see also John Beshears 
et al., Public Policy and Savings for Retirement: The “Autosave” Features of the Pension Protection 
Reform Act of 2006, in BETTER LIVING THROUGH ECONOMICS (John J. Siegfried, ed. 2010) (reviewing 
economic evidence underlying auto-enrollment rules); On Amir & Orly Lobel, Liberalism and 
Lifestyle: Informing Regulatory Governance with Behavioural Research, 1 EUROPEAN J. OF RISK REG. 
17, 20 (2012) (“[B]ehavioural insights can help policy improve individual decisions-making processes 
as well as identify limits of the corrective solutions to cognitive failures.”).  
20 Most of these responses were near the benchmark estimate ranges, but some were high outliers, as 
discussed below. 
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Furthermore, respondents estimated certain components that affect costs, including 
likely future insurance coverage, premiums, and life expectancy at levels 
surprisingly close to what experts predict. These results suggest that a significant 
portion of respondents understand approximate future resources needed to sustain 
typical healthcare expenses and that lack of understanding, alone, does not explain 
financial planning challenges.21 On the other hand, a significant portion of responses 
deviated from the expert benchmarks. More than 50% of respondents’ estimates of 
monthly out-of-pocket expenditures fell below experts’ projections for the twenty-
fifth percentile of retiree out-of-pocket spending. Our median response was over a 
quarter below the expert median benchmark. Some subgroups’ estimates deviated 
relatively further from benchmarks.22 For example, younger cohorts tended to offer 
estimates similar to those of older cohorts, raising potential concerns that younger 
respondents may not be anticipating the increases in healthcare expenditures that 
experts predict for the coming decades.23 Women respondents projected 50% lower 
lifetime expenditures ($30,000 median estimate) than their male counterparts 
($60,000 median estimates), despite experts’ estimates that the typical woman will 
spend 50% more over her retirement on healthcare costs than the typical man.24 
These findings suggest the possibility that ignorance may impede successful 
planning for some.  
Second, we saw broad misperceptions with regard to the uncertainty of future 
healthcare spending. Spending uncertainty arises from three main sources: 
unpredictable individual health experience, unexpected medical cost growth, or 
policy instability. The distribution of medical spending among retirees is highly 
skewed and largely unpredictable.25 Someone with extensive medical needs or the 
fortune to live a long life may spend two to three times as much as the typical 
retiree.26 Further, future out-of-pocket exposure, even for the typical retiree, depends 
on the rate of future healthcare inflation, which has outpaced economic growth for a 
number of years27 and may continue to do so.28 Finally, the future of policies 
regarding Medicare, Medicaid, and private retiree insurance coverage is in flux and 
the effects of the 2010 health reform law, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (collectively 
                                                 
21 In this study, we did not explore the important related question of whether individual expectations 
correlate to actual savings for those expenses. 
22 In analyzing our survey results, we attempted to explore the extent to which respondent estimates 
correlated with factors that experts have found to be associated with higher retiree healthcare costs and 
found mixed results. Such demographic factors can predict about 20% to 25% of the variance in spending 
among members of a population. Joseph P. Newhouse, Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: 
Efficiency in Production Versus Selection, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1236, 1256 (1996). Respondent 
estimates of costs corresponded as experts would predict with some factors, including household income 
levels (which experts associate with higher expenditures, as discussed below), some financial literacy 
proxies, and  anticipated insurance coverage.  In contrast, women in our survey estimated lower lifetime 
spending than men, contrary to what experts report. 
23 Interpretation of this result is ambiguous, as discussed below.  
24 FRONSTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 9 fig.2. 
25 Marc L. Berk & Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration of Health Care Expenditures, Revisited, 
20 HEALTH AFF. 9, 9 (2001).  
26 See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.  
27 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 1, 27 (2010) (reporting that from 
1975-2008, excess cost growth in Medicare was 2.5%, in Medicaid was 2.0%, in all other forms of 
health insurance was 1.8%, and overall was 1.9%). 
28 This inflation is often called “excess cost growth,” defined as the increase in healthcare 
spending per person over the growth of GDP per person, adjusted for demographic changes in the 
population that might affect healthcare spending. See id. at 10. 
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referred to herein as “PPACA”)29 on out-of-pocket spending are uncertain. In 
contrast to the mixed findings above, our respondents consistently did not seem to 
understand spending uncertainty and the potential impact it could have on their 
individual spending. They failed to differentiate between the three aforementioned 
sources of uncertainty, which pose very different levels of risk. Furthermore, they 
underestimated the potential effect of individual health experience, which can result 
in an individual having double to triple expenditures of the typical retiree;30 only a 
fifth of all respondents estimated that adverse health experience could lead to a more 
than 50% increase in out-of-pocket costs. To oversimplify, some people know costs; 
few know risk.   
While our findings do not point to any one particular solution, they help to 
sharpen the problem definition, prioritize future research, and identify what solutions 
might be most promising. As discussed in Part IV, our findings elucidate two 
different problems. The first is that, while our current healthcare policies rely on 
individuals to finance significant out-of-pocket spending, only some individuals 
anticipate this future spending. Because ignorance may impede successful financial 
planning, we discuss potential interventions to help individuals plan better and avoid 
being unprepared for unanticipated spending in retirement. The second problem we 
found, namely a pervasive and significant misapprehension of spending uncertainty, 
is equally a problem of insurance regulation and a problem of inadequate 
knowledge. We discuss why this shortcoming may be best addressed by regulatory 
and policy reforms aimed to ensure that retiree health insurance provide financial 
security in the face of spending uncertainty, even when retirees fail to grasp the 
magnitude of this uncertainty themselves.  
II. WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT RETIREE OUT-OF-POCKET HEALTHCARE 
EXPENDITURES 
A. BACKGROUND ON OUT-OF-POCKET EXPENDITURES 
Retiree out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures include any amount the retiree 
pays directly for healthcare.31 These expenditures include two categories of costs: 
(1) premium costs for insurance coverage (Medicare and supplemental insurance 
policies) and (2) expenditures for services or items paid for directly by the insured, 
which includes cost-sharing (deductibles, co-payments, and coinsurance required by 
Medicare or a supplemental policy) and expenses for care that is not covered by 
insurance (e.g., dental care under many policies).32  
Retirees must determine how to piece together Medicare coverage and 
supplemental coverage to best meet their needs, which requires navigating a 
complex landscape of coverage options and tradeoffs. Medicare finances over half of 
total healthcare costs33 for about 39 million eligible individuals age sixty-five and 
                                                 
29 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 
1029 (to be codified primarily in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
30 See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.  
31 KFF CHARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 70 fig.7.2. 
32 See id. at 71 fig.7.3 (Bar graph shows breakdown of out-of-pocket expenditures between 
premiums and services in 2006). 
33See also id. at 70 (reporting that Medicare finances 48% of total costs of healthcare for 
Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries, who will have a lower portion of their costs financed than 
Medicare Advantage beneficiaries).  
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older.34 Original, or “fee-for-service,” Medicare is composed of two parts: Part A for 
hospital and inpatient care, as well as some home healthcare, and Part B 
Supplementary Medical Insurance primarily for outpatient care. For most, 
enrollment in Part A is automatic and free.35 Beneficiaries pay a monthly premium to 
enroll in Part B, which began at $115.40 in 2011 for the standard premiums and 
increased on a sliding scale based on income.36 Low-income enrollees (under 133% 
of the federal poverty level (FPL)) with limited assets are eligible for the Medicare 
Savings Program (MSP), which defrays all or part of their Medicare premiums and 
cost-sharing obligations, and assistance with prescription drug costs through the 
Low-Income Subsidy (LIS) program.37 While an estimated 3.6 million are eligible 
for MSPs,38 less than one-third of those eligible enroll, which we return to in Part IV 
below.  
Medicare leaves enrollees vulnerable to potentially high out-of-pocket spending 
for using medical care and has no out-of-pocket spending limits.39 For example, in 
2013, Part A includes a deductible of $1184 per hospitalization.40 For hospital stays 
longer than 60 days, beneficiaries have cost sharing of $296 per day for days 61 to 
90, $592 per day for days 91 to 150, and no coverage after 150 days.41 For outpatient 
care, beneficiaries pay a $147 deductible and 20% coinsurance for most services.42  
Ninety percent of all retirees obtain supplemental insurance coverage, from one 
of four main sources, to help fill in these gaps.43 For those without supplemental 
                                                 
34 Dahlia K. Remler & Sherry A. Glied, What Other Programs Can Teach Us: Increasing 
Participation in Health Insurance Programs, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 67, 68 (2003) (reporting that 
99% of eligible persons take up Medicare Part A and 95.5% Medicare Part B). 
35 KFF CHARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 22. Part A is premium-free if an individual or spouse 
worked forty or more quarters of Medicare-covered employment where they contributed Medicare 
payroll taxes. Medicare Part A, EXTENDHEALTH.COM, https://www.extendhealth.com/medicare/part-a 
(last visited Dec. 14, 2012). 
36 KFF CHARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 22. 
37 GRETCHEN JACOBSON ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE ROLE OF MEDICARE FOR 
PEOPLE DUALLY ELIGIBLE FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID 9-10 (2011) (describing how Medicaid 
defrays premiums or cost sharing for Qualified Medicare Beneficiaries (QMBs), who must earn under 
100% of the FPL to receive assistance with Medicare premiums and cost-sharing; Specified Low-
Income Medicare Beneficiaries (SLMBs), who have incomes between 100% and 120% of the FPL and 
are eligible for assistance with Medicare Part B premiums; and Qualified Individuals (QIs), who earn 
between 120% to 135% of the FPL and receive assistance with premiums in limited circumstances. To 
qualify for any of these programs, a beneficiary must have assets at or below $6880 for an individual 
or $10,020 for a couple in 2011). For reference, in 2012, the FPL was just over $11,000 for an 
individual and just over $15,000 for a couple. 2012 HHS Poverty Guidelines, ASPE, 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/12poverty.shtml (last updated Feb. 9, 2012). 
38 Stan Dorn & Boaping Shang, Spurring Enrollment in Medicare Savings Programs Through a 
Substitute for the Asset Test Focused on Investment Income, 31 HEALTH AFF. 367, 368-70 (estimating 
3.6 million eligible for the three MSP programs and under a third enrolled in each). The authors 
explain low enrollment as due in part to the application process, including a “burdensome” asset test 
and recommend replacing the asset test with an investment income test. Id. at 368-69. 
39 What Are the Medicare Premiums and Coinsurance Rates for 2013?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., http://answers.hhs.gov/questions/3006. (last visited Jan. 13, 2012).  
40 Medicare Costs at a Glance, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/your-medicare-
costs/costs-at-a-glance/costs-at-glance.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2012).  
41 Id.  
42 Id. There is also significant cost sharing and limited coverage for skilled nursing. Id. 
43 KFF CHARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 60. While we use this data on supplemental coverage as a 
benchmark, it does not perfectly reflect frequency of forms of supplemental coverage among retirees 
for two reasons. First, it includes non-elderly disabled on Medicare. Second, KFF only listed one form 
of supplemental coverage for each individual according to the following hierarchy: “1) Medicare 
Advantage, 2) Medicaid, 3) Employer, 4) Medigap, 5) Other public/private coverage, 6) No 
supplemental coverage. Individuals with more than one source of coverage were assigned to the 
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coverage through an employer, choosing a supplemental policy among the many 
options is complex and has high stakes because out-of-pocket spending can vary 
significantly, based on the supplemental coverage an individual has.44 About one-
third of Medicare beneficiaries currently have supplemental employer-sponsored 
insurance (ESI) for retirees, usually subsidized by the employer.45 ESI generally 
provides comprehensive coverage at a relatively low cost to retirees,46 but it is 
becoming less frequently available as employers drop retiree coverage.47 Another 
one-quarter of beneficiaries enroll in Medicare Advantage (also known as Medicare 
Part C), instead of fee-for-service Medicare (Medicare Parts A and B).48 They elect 
approved private insurance policy that combines the benefits of Part A and B, 
usually Part D prescription drug coverage, and sometimes dental or vision 
coverage.49 In 2011, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) limited 
the out-of-pocket spending on Medicare Advantage plans to $6700.50 An additional 
                                                                                                                      
category that appears highest in the ordering.” Id. This methodology will underestimate forms of 
supplemental coverage lower in the hierarchy, such as “other public/private coverage.” Id. As an 
example, 22% of Medicare Advantage enrollees have an additional form of coverage (10% self-
purchased private coverage; 10% employer-sponsored; 1% both self-purchased and employer-
sponsored). HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EXAMINING SOURCES OF COVERAGE AMONG 
MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES: SUPPLEMENTAL INSURANCE, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE, AND PRESCRIPTION 
DRUG COVERAGE 17 exhibit 3.9 (2008).  
44 Those with Medigap supplemental coverage face the greatest total out-of-pocket exposure 
(even more than those with no supplemental coverage, who are spared premium costs and may 
consume less care than they would otherwise). Dana P. Goldman & Julie M. Zissimopoulos, High 
Out-of-Pocket Care Spending by the Elderly, 22 HEALTH AFF. 194, 198 (2003). In contrast, those with 
Medicaid are likely to spend much less out-of-pocket, due to the low premiums and cost-sharing 
obligations and possibly also due to consumption constraints. Id. at 198-99; see also KFF 
CHARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 78. Including residential long-term care, Kaiser reports average out-of-
pocket spending in 2006 of $5066 for a beneficiary with supplemental Medigap, $4275 with 
supplemental ESI, $3979 with no supplemental coverage, $3518 with Medicare Advantage, and $2843 
with Medicaid. KFF CHARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 78. Another study, based on 2005 MCBS data 
(prior to Medicare Part D) and also including long-term care spending, reports median spending of 
$3819 for a beneficiary with supplemental Medigap, $2909 with ESI, $2258 for Medicare Advantage, 
$1864 with no supplemental coverage, and $490 with Medicaid. TRICIA NEUMAN ET AL., HENRY J. 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., REVISITING ‘SKIN IN THE GAME’ AMONG MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES: AN 
UPDATED ANALYSIS OF THE INCREASED FINANCIAL BURDEN OF HEALTH CARE SPENDING FROM 1997 
TO 2005 2 (2009). This variability persists with regard to total lifetime spending. FRONSTIN ET AL., 
supra note 1, at 9 (estimating median spending of $65,000 for a man with wraparound Medicare 
coverage, $66,000 for ESI coverage that an employer subsidizes, and $109,000 for unsubsidized ESI 
coverage).  
45 See KFF CHARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 60.  
46 See id. at 72 (reporting average premiums of $2000 in 2006).  
47 See FRONSTIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 14. The percentage of private-sector employers 
offering coverage to Medicare-eligible retirees decreased from 21.6% in 1987 to 12.7% in 2005. Id. at 
12. Some attribute this decline to a 1990 rule by the Financial Accounting Standards Board that 
required employers to report retiree health liabilities in annual reports. See id. at 11. Even when 
employers offer ESI, it has become more expensive and less widely available among retirees. See id. 
at 14; see also HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEWITT, FINDINGS FROM KAISER/HEWITT 2006 
SURVEY ON RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS 19-20 (2006) (listing survey results on ESI changes that 
affected under sixty-five and over sixty-five retiree health benefits). 
48 See KFF CHARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 60. 
49 Medicare Advantage Plans, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/navigation/medicare-
basics/medicare-benefits/part-c.aspx (last visited June 3, 2011). Some pay an additional monthly 
premium on top of the Part B premium; others plans are “zero premium.” The average premium in 
2011 was forty-three dollars, based on the cost of plans with prescription drug coverage. Medicare 
Advantage providers often receive government rebates, based on plan cost savings over traditional 
Medicare, which they can use to provide additional services or reduce premiums. Id.  
50 MARSHA GOLD ET AL., MEDICARE ADVANTAGE 2012 SPOTLIGHT: PLAN AVAILABILITY AND 
PREMIUMS 1 (2011).  
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17% of beneficiaries buy a supplemental “Medigap” policy from a private insurer.51 
Medigap plans are standardized by plan type, organized alphabetically from A to N. 
Although these plans often have high premium costs, most offer first-dollar coverage 
of many or all of the costs not covered by Medicare.52 Premiums vary by plan type 
and by state and can range from under $100 to over $400 per month.53 The most 
popular plans (Plans C and F)54 cover nearly all costs that Medicare does not;55 some 
Plan F beneficiaries opt for a “high deductible” option where they pay the first 
$2000 in expenditures,56 after which the Medigap plan covers all costs. Finally, 
about 15% to 16% of Medicare beneficiaries are “dually eligible” for Medicaid if 
they are disabled or meet the income and assets thresholds, which differ state by 
state, 57 in which case they pay little or no premiums and cost-sharing. While 
variable across states, these thresholds are low across the board,58 which means that 
Medicaid coverage only protects a subset of the poorest retirees against significant 
out-of-pocket exposure. 
Ninety percent of Medicare enrollees also have a source of supplemental 
prescription drug coverage, mostly under the Medicare Part D prescription drug 
benefit,59 which took effect in 2006 as established by the Medicare Prescription Dug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003.60 In 2012, after $4700 in out-of-
pocket spending on prescription drugs, a beneficiary has “catastrophic coverage,” in 
which the plan pays 95% of additional costs.61 
                                                 
51 KFF CHARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 60. Medigap policies typically do not cover long-term care, 
vision, dental, hearing aids, or private nursing care. See id. at 20. 
52 See Baicker & Levy, supra note 2, at 1773-74.  
53 See Medigap Policy Search, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/find-a-plan/questions/ 
medigap-home.aspx (last visited May 31, 2011). Premiums were calculated based on information 
provided by the search feature on May 31, 2011. 
54 AM.’S HEALTH INS. PLANS, MEDIGAP: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 3 (2011), available at 
www.ahip.org/MedigapWhatYouNeedtoKnow/ (reporting 17% of beneficiaries enrolled in Plan C and 45% 
in Plan F in 2009). 
55 See KATHRYN LINEHAN, NAT’L HEALTH POLICY FORUM, NO. 845, RECENT PROPOSALS TO LIMIT 
MEDIGAP COVERAGE AND MODIFY MEDICARE COST SHARING, NAT’L 5 (Feb. 24, 2012), 
http://www.nhpf.org/library/issue-briefs/IB845_MedigapandCostSharing_02-24-12.pdf.  
56 Id. 
57See JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 37, at 3 (reporting that 21% of Medicare eligibles were dual-
eligibles for Medicaid, just over three-quarters of whom are “fully” eligible for Medicaid benefits).  
58 For example, a majority of states are required by Federal Medicaid participation rules to 
provide full Medicaid dual eligibility to those who meet the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
Program income and asset limits, which for an individual is income under 75% of the FPL and assets 
under $2000. Id. at 8. Some states, known as “209(b) states,” may set lower eligibility levels. Id. Even 
if not fully eligible for Medicaid, some Medicare beneficiaries are eligible for Medicaid assistance 
with all or some of their Medicare premiums and cost sharing through MSPs, as discussed above. Id. 
at 2-3. Most states provide full Medicaid benefits at slightly higher income and asset levels than 
required or for non-mandatory populations, including the “medically needy,” nursing home residents, 
or others in community-based long-term care under a waiver program. Id. at 8. 
59 Id. The average monthly Part D plan premium is just over forty dollars. JACK HOADLEY ET AL., 
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE PART D SPOTLIGHT: PART D PLAN AVAILABILITY IN 
2011 AND KEY CHANGES SINCE 2006 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/8107.pdf (estimating 2011 premium weighted by enrollment, 
based on 2010 enrollment). In 2010, about 60% had a Medicare Part D plan for prescription drugs, 
nearly 20% had coverage through an ESI retiree plan, and 13% had some other coverage. KFF 
CHARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 34 fig.3.1. 
60 Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
61 JACK HOADLEY ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., ANALYSIS OF MEDICARE 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG PLANS IN 2012 AND KEY TRENDS SINCE 2006 exhibit 1 (2012) (depicting cost 
sharing in Part D plans including $4700 “True Out-of-Pocket Spending” or “TROOP,” which triggers 
catastrophic coverage). 
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Even with supplemental insurance for medical and prescription drug expenses, 
retirees still face out-of-pocket expenses for cost-sharing obligations, when they use 
care covered by their policies, and for items or services not covered by Medicare or 
supplemental coverage. Of course, they are also subject to premiums for Medicare 
and supplemental coverage, as described above. According to one study, the major 
components of out-of-pocket spending in 2006 were: premiums (39%), long-term 
care (19%), medical providers and supplies (15%), prescription drugs (14%), dental 
(6%), and inpatient and outpatient hospital costs (5%).62 Excluding long-term care 
costs from this data, premiums are nearly 50% of total costs, medical providers and 
supplies are 19%, and prescription drugs are 17%.63 Out-of-pocket exposure to 
prescription drug costs—a cost highly variable among retirees—will decrease under 
PPACA, as discussed below,64 but will nonetheless remain a major component of 
retiree expenditures, especially for intensive users of prescription drugs.65  
B. MEASURING OUT-OF-POCKET EXPENDITURES 
There is no single obvious benchmark for retiree out-of-pocket spending. 
Previous research on retiree out-of-pocket expenditures has yielded a range of 
different estimates of spending,66 depending on what data source is used or what 
particular categories of spending are included or excluded, as discussed below. 
Acknowledging the lack of a single definitive savings target, we designed our survey 
questions so that we could obtain data in a manner congruent with leading studies, in 
which experts estimate costs in two main ways: annual cost and the net present value 
(NPV) at age sixty-five of total lifetime healthcare spending throughout retirement.  
1. Two Methods of Estimating Out-of-Pocket Expenditures 
a. Annual Estimates 
One common way to measure and project retiree out-of-pocket healthcare 
expenditures is on a periodic basis, such as average monthly or annual expenditures. 
We rely on a 2010 Urban Institute study by Johnson and Mommaerts for 
benchmarks for respondents’ monthly spending estimates (Table One) because it is 
the most recent comprehensive set of estimates. This study reports estimates on an 
individual basis at decade intervals from 2010 to 2040 for each quartile of the 
                                                 
62 KFF CHARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 70. On average, across all forms of supplemental coverage, 
the costs of premiums tend to comprise between 40% and 60% of total out-of-pocket expenses and 
cost-sharing and costs of uncovered healthcare make up the rest. Id. at 72. 
63 Author’s analysis of data in Figure 7.2 in id. at 70 (on file with the authors). 
64 See infra note 136. 
65 FRONSTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 9. 
66 See, e.g., FRONSTIN ET AL., supra note 1; Michael D. Hurd & Susann Rohwedder, The Level 
and Risk of Out-of Pocket Healthcare Spending (Univ. of Mich. Ret. Research Ctr., Working Paper 
No. 2009-218, 2009); Anthony Webb & Natalia Zhivan, How Much Is Enough? The Distribution of 
Lifetime Healthcare Costs (Ctr. for Ret. Research Bos. Coll., Working Paper No. 2010-1, 2010); see 
also Goldman & Zissimopoulos, supra note 44, at 194; Fidelity Investments Estimates Health Care 
Costs for Couples Retiring in 2011 Will Drop to $230K in One-Time Reduction, FIDELTY.COM (Mar. 
31, 2011), http://www.fidelity.com/inside-fidelity/individual-investing/2011-rhcce [hereinafter 
Fidelity Investments Estimates Health Care Costs]; Retirees Face Estimated $240,000 in Medical 
Costs, FIDELITY VIEWPOINTS (May 16, 2012), https://www.fidelity.com/viewpoints/retirees-medical-
expenses. 
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spending distribution and excludes long-term care spending.67 It projects that a 
retiree will spend on average $3278 in 2010 and at the median will spend $2583 in 
2010, $3284 in 2020, $4569 in 2030, and $6214 in 2040—all in constant 2008 
dollars—as reported in Table One.68 For someone at the seventy-fifth percentile of 
the spending distribution, among all retirees, Johnson and Mommaerts estimates 
$3934 in 2010, $4959 in 2020, $6855 in 2030, and $9455 in 2040.69 Based on these 
figures, the share of adults who spend more than one-fifth of household income on 
healthcare will grow to 45% in 2040, from 18% in 2010.70  
 
Table One: Annual Spending Benchmarks
 25th Percentile 
Annual Estimate 
(Monthly) 
Median Annual 
Estimate 
(Monthly) 
75th Percentile 
Annual Estimate 
(Monthly) 
90th Percentile 
Annual Estimate 
(Monthly) 
2010 $1909 ($159) $2583 ($215) $3934 ($330) $5854 ($488) 
2020 $2453 ($204) $3284 ($274) $4959 ($413) $7272 ($606) 
2030 $3398 ($283) $4569 ($381) $6855 ($571) $10,053 ($838) 
2040 $4595 ($383) $6214 ($518) $9455 ($788) $13,971 ($1164) 
Source: RICHARD W. JOHNSON & CORINA MOMMAERTS, URBAN INST., RETIREMENT POLICY PROGRAM, 
WILL HEALTHCARE COSTS BANKRUPT AGING BOOMERS? (2010). 
Note: Expressed in constant 2008 dollars. Excludes long-term care spending. Uses Medicare Boards of 
Trustees 2009 intermediate growth rate of 2.8%. Estimates generated using Urban Institute DYNASIM3 
micro simulation model and healthcare spending data in MEPS. 
 
Other studies that have estimated annual costs are less useful as benchmarks for 
our purposes, because they are less comprehensive (e.g., don’t include estimates at 
different percentiles of spending), are older, or include long-term care, but they 
triangulate roughly with and validate the reasonableness of relying on the Johnson 
and Mommaerts’ figures as benchmark estimates.71 None of these studies, including 
Johnson and Mommaerts, considers changes to spending that will result from 
PPACA. This means that for some retirees, spending could be as much as 20% to 
30% lower than these estimates, based on reductions to out-of-pocket prescription 
drug spending under Medicare Part D and adjustments to the terms of Medigap Plan 
F, as explained below.72 For others, it will remain similar.73 On the other hand, all of 
                                                 
67 JOHNSON & MOMMAERTS, supra note 6 (using the Urban Institute DYNASIM3 model to 
simulate insurance coverage and project spending as a function of insurance coverage and 2006 
Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) data on insurance coverage and 2006 MEPS data, which only 
includes community-dwelling individuals, on out-of-pocket costs. They exclude the costs of long-term 
care and indicate that they use a 2009 intermediate growth rate of 2.8% for medical cost growth, 
which they say they have based on Medicare Trustees’ projections). 
68 Id. at 11.  
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 13.  
71 A Kaiser Family Foundation analysis of 2006 MCBS data, which includes long-term care 
costs, reports average per capita cost in 2006 of $4241; no medians are available. KFF CHARTBOOK, 
supra note 4, at 70. Long-term care costs were 19% on average, which means average annual out-of-
pocket spending was just over $3400 when excluding long-term care, slightly more than $100 higher 
than Johnson and Mommaerts’ average ($3278). Id.; JOHNSON & MOMMAERTS, supra note 6, at 11. 
CMS estimated average annual out-of-pocket spending of $3800 for an individual retired in 2007, 
again with no medians reported. MUNNELL ET AL., supra note 6, at 3.  
72 This estimate is based on comparing EBRI’s estimated median spending for a man and a 
woman with wraparound Medicare coverage from 2009, before PPACA, to their estimate in 2010, 
after PPACA. FRONSTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 9 (estimating costs after PPACA); see also PAUL 
FRONSTIN ET AL., EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., NO. 6, SAVINGS NEEDED FOR HEALTH EXPENSES IN 
RETIREMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF PERSONS AGES 55 AND 65 IN 2009 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_06-June09.HlthSvg-RetFndg1.pdf (estimating costs in 
2009, before PPACA).  
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these studies are at least several years old and would be higher if updated to 2012 
spending levels.  
While the effect of PPACA could mean that the Johnson and Mommaerts 
longer-range estimates are too high, this study nonetheless projects that the typical 
retiree will spend in excess of $200 a month on healthcare costs now and a good deal 
more than that a decade or more down the road.  
b. Lifetime Spending 
A second way to estimate retiree healthcare expenditures is based on lifetime 
spending, or the net present value at age sixty-five of spending throughout 
retirement. This estimate is particularly important for retirees who will finance 
expenditures mostly out of savings, rather than out of cash flow. As a lump-sum 
benchmark, we rely on a 2010 Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) report 
by Fronstin et al., summarized in Table Two, which we chose both because it was 
the only study we found that incorporates the effects of PPACA on retiree out-of-
pocket spending and it generates estimates at different percentiles of spending.74 
This study reports estimated median lifetime retiree healthcare costs of $65,000 for a 
man and $93,000 for a woman ($158,000 for a couple) retiring in 2010, not 
including long-term care expenses and using Medicare Boards of Trustees excess 
cost growth estimates.75 For someone retiring in 2020, the estimates are considerably 
higher ($109,000 median estimate for a man and $156,000 for a woman and seventy-
fifth percentile estimate of $198,000 for a man and $230,000 for a woman).76 These 
estimates are based on individuals with median drug expenditures and “wraparound” 
Medicare coverage (i.e., Parts A, B, D and Medigap Plan F).77 The EBRI estimates 
are similar for an individual with supplemental ESI, whose employer contributes to 
coverage, but nearly 70% higher in the case of no employer contribution.78 Because, 
as noted above,79 beneficiaries with supplemental Medigap spend more out-of-
pocket than those with most other forms of supplemental coverage (or with no 
coverage), some of our respondent population would have expected spending lower 
than these benchmarks. 
  
 
 
                                                                                                                      
73 Id. (estimates for retirees with employment-based supplemental coverage vary less, showing a 
decrease of 3% to 10%).  
74 FRONSTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 9. This benchmark study uses MEPS data, which excludes 
institutionalized patients (i.e., those in residential nursing home care) who tend to be more expensive, 
which could make the EBRI estimates lower than they would be if the entire population were 
considered. 
75 Id. Authors don’t indicate the figure they are using for excess cost growth, but the 2011 
Medicare Trustees report assumed excess cost growth of 1.4% for Medicare Parts A and B and 2.5% 
for Part D for the first ten years and assumes growth of GDP plus one after year seventy-five. 
Estimates for years ten to twenty-five are based on linear interpolation between year ten and twenty-
five. BDS. OF TRS., FED. HOSP. INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TRUST FUNDS, 2011 ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE AND FEDERAL 
SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 12 [hereinafter BDS. OF TRUSTEES 2011], 
available at https://www.cms.gov/ReportsTrustFunds/downloads/tr2011.pdf. 
76 Id. 
77 FRONSTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 7. 
78 Id. at 9 (median estimate of $109,000 for a man and $146,000 for a woman and seventy-fifth 
percentile estimate of $165,000 for a man and $192,000 for a woman retiring in 2010 with 
unsubsidized ESI). 
79 See KFF CHARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 72. 
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Table Two: Lifetime Spending Benchmarks 
 Median Estimate 75th Percentile Estimate 
90th Percentile 
Estimate 
Man retiring in 2010 $65,000 $118,000 $187,000 
Woman retiring in 2010 $93,000 $137,000 $213,000 
Man retiring in 2020 $109,000 $198,000 $313,000 
Woman retiring in 2020 $156,000 $230,000 $357,000 
Source: PAUL FRONSTIN ET AL., EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., NO. 351, ISSUE BRIEF: FUNDING SAVINGS 
NEEDED FOR HEALTH EXPENSES FOR PERSONS ELIGIBLE FOR MEDICARE (2010). 
Note: Excludes long-term care spending and uses Medicare Boards of Trustees intermediate growth rate. 
Based upon an individual with wraparound Medicare (Medicare Parts A, B, D, and Medigap Plan F). The 
Median Estimate is for someone with median drug spending saving enough to have a 50/50 chance of 
covering healthcare out-of-pocket costs. The 75th percentile is their estimate for someone with 75th 
percentile drug spending saving for 75% chance of coving healthcare out-of-pocket costs. The 90th 
percentile is their estimate for someone with 90th percentile drug spending saving for 90% chance of 
coving healthcare out-of-pocket costs.  
 
The 2010 EBRI estimates are 20% to 30% lower than their own 2009 
estimates,80 due mostly to PPACA reforms that reduce Medicare Part D out-of-
pocket expenses.81 Other studies, most of which estimate costs for an intact couple, 
not individuals, are within 10% to 20% of the EBRI estimates.82  
c. Limitations of Expert Studies as Benchmarks 
There are limitations in relying on expert studies as benchmarks. First, studies 
of retiree out-of-pocket spending rely on a mix of Medicare claims data and survey 
data that capture self-reported out-of-pocket spending. Researchers disagree on 
which survey data is most accurate83 among the three main datasets, each of which 
captures data differently and focuses on a different population: the Health and 
Retirement Survey (HRS),84 the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS),85 and 
the Medicare Current Beneficiaries Survey (MCBS).86 
                                                 
80 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.  
81 FRONSTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 7. 
82 In 2011, Fidelity actuaries estimated $230,000 lifetime out-of-pocket spending for the average 
couple saving to achieve 75% certainty of sufficiency (comparable to the above-cited EBRI estimate 
of $255,000 for a couple). See Fidelity Investments Estimates Health Care Costs, supra note 66; see 
also Putting a Price on Health, FIDELITY VIEWPOINTS (May 20, 2010), 
https://guidance.fidelity.com/viewpoints-workplace/putting-a-price-on-health-pr. A 2010 study by 
Webb & Zhivan estimates $197,000 in 2009 dollars for an average couple (most comparable to the 
EBRI $158,000 median) with a high school education and free of chronic disease at age 65, excluding 
long-term care expenses. Webb & Zhivan, supra note 66, at 37. This study uses a 4.2% rate of 
inflation-adjusted cost growth, based on 1960-2007 experience. Using a lower rate of 3.2%, based on 
CMS projections from 2007, they calculate an NPV that is 11% lower. This study excludes Medicaid-
eligible households, those with long-term care insurance, and those with zero medical expenses and 
assumes that households are not subject to spending constraints, focusing on those who will finance 
most out-of-pocket spending on their own. Id. at 4. 
83 For example, Hurd & Rohwedder caution that the data in the HRS study is higher than the 
other two surveys by as much as 50% at the mean. Hurd & Rohwedder, supra note 66, at 17 tbl.6. In 
contrast, Samuel Marshall, Kathleen McGarry and Jonathan Skinner disagree that the HRS numbers 
are inflated, even if higher. Samuel Marshall et al., The Risk of Out-of-Pocket Healthcare 
Expenditures at End of Life, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16170, 2010). They 
argue the detailed questions in the HRS elicit data that respondents may omit in other studies. Id. HRS 
also conducts “exit interviews” with relatives of deceased participants to capture spending in the last 
year of life and uses “unfolding brackets” to reduce non-response, both of which increase estimates 
and, perhaps, accuracy. Webb & Zhivan, supra note 66, at 8. 
84 HRS is a long-running biennial panel survey that is broader than healthcare and collects data 
from about 20,000 individuals fifty-one or older. Hurd & Rohwedder, supra note 66, at 4. This survey 
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Second, studies are inconsistent in what out-of-pocket costs they capture in 
estimates, particularly with regard to costs for treatment not covered by insurance, 
such as dental care and vision care, and the costs of long-term care. For example, 
some studies exclude institutional long-term care costs (e.g., assisted living facility 
or nursing home),87 which generally include little medical care costs, when 
estimating healthcare costs on the theory that most people do not (and perhaps 
should not) save for long-term care costs in light of the availability of Medicaid as a 
safety net.88  
Finally, estimating future medical costs—both for experts and for untrained 
individuals—is an uncertain science because of the unpredictable nature of medical 
cost inflation and policy uncertainty, as discussed further below.89 Researchers have 
to make assumptions about both of these factors that, at times, feel like little more 
than a shot in the dark. Medical care costs have been growing at a faster rate than the 
rest of the economy for some time now. From 1975 to 2008, Medicare spending 
grew on average 2.5 percentage points faster per year than the GDP, and overall 
medical spending grew on average 1.9 percentage points faster than the GDP.90 It is 
difficult to predict to what extent this level of growth will and can persist going 
forward. Most studies we cite rely upon projections of future cost growth made by 
the Medicare Boards of Trustees, calculated annually by the Office of the Actuary 
(OACT). OACT statistically models costs for the first ten years into the future and 
economically models the last fifty-one years of the seventy-five year projection 
period, using a linear interpolation to connect year ten to year twenty-five.91 Until 
                                                                                                                      
asks about all categories of out-of-pocket spending, including prescription drugs but focuses less on 
such inquiries than other studies do. Id.  
85 MEPS is a two-year household panel survey of community-dwelling individuals (i.e. excludes 
nursing home residents), which has a smaller sample of the older population than HRS and thus lower 
expenditures per person on average. See GARY ENGELHARDT & JONATHAN GRUBER, CTR. FOR RET. 
RESEARCH BOS. COLL., NO. 11-8, DOES MEDICARE PART D PROTECT THE ELDERLY FROM FINANCIAL 
RISK? (2011), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/IB_11-8-508.pdf. MEPS 
triangulates data from the patient survey with a provider survey. Some believe the data to be better 
quality. Hurd & Rohwedder, supra note 66, at 4. 
86 MCBS is a rotating four-year panel survey of people enrolled in Medicare, who may reside in 
either community or long-term care facilities, and asks participants to keep health spending diaries to 
capture data in more detail and more accurately. Id. at 4-5.  
87 See KFF CHARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 68-73. Because long-term care takes many forms, some 
studies do, however, pick up some long-term expenditures for non-institutional patients, including 
short term nursing home stays, home-based care, or post-acute care, especially when financed by 
Medicare. 
88 Hurd & Rohwedder, supra note 66, at 3.  
89 John N. Friedman, Predicting Medicare Cost Growth, in IMPROVING HEALTH CARE COST 
PROJECTIONS FOR THE MEDICARE POPULATION: SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP 83, 83 app. A (Gooloo S. 
Wunderlich rapporteur, 2010), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK52808/ 
pdf/TOC.pdf (describing the different methodologies used to calculate Medicare cost growth and the 
limitations of each); see also BDS. OF TRS., FED. HOSP. INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. 
TRUST FUNDS, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL 
INSURANCE AND FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 12-20 (describing 
the complex methodology used to project Medicare cost growth); Memorandum from John D. Shatto 
& M. Kent Clemens, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Office of the Actuary, on Projected 
Medicare Expenditures Under Illustrative Scenarios with Alternative Payment Updates to Medicare 
Providers (May 18, 2012) (on file with authors) (explaining generally the difficulty in deciding on 
Medicare cost growth projections under PPACA). 
90 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 27, at 27.  
91 See IMPROVING HEALTH CARE COST PROJECTIONS FOR THE MEDICARE POPULATION: 
SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP, supra note 89, at 7-8 (describing OACT’s methodologies for projecting 
Medicare expenditures). OACT projects each category of spending for the first ten years into the 
future, using “demographically-adjusted extrapolations of past cost growth.” Id. OACT then uses a 
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2012, OACT has assumed that for the final fifty-one years, long-term cost growth 
will be GDP plus 1%, based on an assumption that one of several forces will serve as 
a brake on long-term cost growth to slow down the rate over time.92 Despite 
considerable efforts made to project long-term medical cost growth, these estimates 
involve significant guesswork and can have a large impact on study results.93 This 
means that even as we use the Johnson and Mommaerts and EBRI estimates as a 
proxy for likely future spending, we acknowledge that they are necessarily an 
imperfect proxy and actual spending may differ from these estimates. 
2. A Note on Demographics and Spending Variation  
While most spending variation is uncertain, as discussed further in Part C 
below, certain observable factors hold predictive value and together explain an 
estimated 20% to 25% of spending variation on a population basis.94 Predictive 
factors include income, sex/longevity, and health status.  
Higher income or wealth corresponds to greater out-of-pocket expenditures, 
reflecting that to some extent retiree healthcare spending is discretionary, especially 
if long-term care costs are included.95 A 2010 study by Marshall et al. reports 
median expenditures of $5061 in the last year of life ($11,618 on average), but those 
in the highest income quintile have median spending of $6761 ($14,269 on average), 
as compared to median spending of $2689 for the lowest quintile ($9046 on 
average).96 This differential means that the median retiree in the top quintile of 
income spends nearly 2.5 times more in the last year of life than the median retiree 
in the lowest. Wealth matters even more than income, with median spending in the 
top quintile in the Marshall study ($8381) four times that in the bottom ($2013), due 
to higher spending in all categories, including insurance, drugs, and home care.97 
This study concludes that higher-income retirees are buying independence, which 
the authors assert could be one way that wealth buys health.98 Other studies show 
that spending is also higher for higher-income retirees in years prior to the last year 
                                                                                                                      
Computable General Equilibrium Model (CGE) to forecast years twenty-five to seventy-five and fill 
in the median timeframe through linear interpolation between year ten and twenty-five. Id. This 
method benefits from capturing “endogenous growth reduction” as healthcare consumes more of 
income, but does not take into account heterogeneity of preferences and assumes that healthcare 
operates as a standard good, not dealing with issues of moral hazard, adverse selection, or supply-side 
incentives for use of care. Id. at 7.  
92 The model does not specify how such slowdown would occur, but it might occur in theory 
though increased supply and decreased demand as more of income is taken up by out-of-pocket costs 
or due to policy changes. Id. at 8. Parties disagreed over the appropriate assumption for long-term 
medical cost growth in 2012 in light of the policy changes enacted by PPACA. Memorandum from 
Shatto & Clemens, supra note 89, at 1.  
93 Other governmental offices use different methods and, for example, the Congressional Budget 
Office’s (CBO) estimates are higher than the OACT estimates because the only brake on cost growth 
that CBO assumes is that non-healthcare consumption will not decline. See IMPROVING HEALTH CARE 
COST PROJECTIONS FOR THE MEDICARE POPULATION: SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP, supra note 89, at 8.  
94 Newhouse, supra note 22.  
95 Goldman & Zissimopoulos, supra note 44, at 197 exhibit 2 (reporting spending for low, middle 
and high income earners with increasing out-of-pocket spending as income increases); Marshall et al., 
supra note 83, at 4 (finding that spending in the last year of life is greater at higher income quartiles). 
Low incomes is defined as less than $12,600, middle as $12,600 to $38,860, and high income as above 
$38,860, all in 1998 dollars); De Nardi et al., supra note 11, at 53 fig.3 (modeling average medical 
expensive by permanent income quintile from age 74 to 100 and showing increased spending at each 
income quintile, including nursing home costs).  
96 Marshall et al., supra note 83, at 25. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 4. 
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of life, with spending for those above 400% of the FPL nearly twice of those below 
100% of the FPL.99  
Another major determinant of total lifetime spending is gender, due to longevity 
and the fact that women less often have employer-sponsored supplemental retiree 
coverage and buy expensive Medigap policies instead.100 For those turning sixty-five 
in 2007, the average life expectancy for a man was eighty-two and for a woman was 
eighty-five.101 As noted above, the 2010 EBRI study estimates lifetime out-of-pocket 
spending of $65,000 to $118,000 for a man at the fiftieth to seventy-fifth percentile 
and $93,000 to $137,000 for a woman,102 which means women retiring in 2010 are 
expected to spend 43% more than men at the median and 16% more at the seventy-
fifth percentile. Studies also indicate that women have higher average annual out-of-
pocket spending.103 
Some factors, such as health status and age, have less straightforward effects. 
While annual expenditures are more for those identifying as in poor health, they live 
shorter lives and have lower total lifetime out-of-pocket expenditures. An 
individual’s health in any one year affects the out-of-pocket costs she will incur in 
that year and to a limited degree may predict costs in a future year.104 One study 
indicates that an individual with self-reported poor health spent as much as 30% to 
40% more in 2006 ($5030) than someone reporting very good ($3744) or excellent 
($3542) health.105 On the other hand, another study by Sun et al. shows that the 
healthier retirees spend more in total over their retirement years because they live for 
and incur costs over more years.106 While this study concurs that healthier retirees 
spend less on average annually,107 the authors estimate that for a couple turning 
sixty-five in 2009, the average lifetime cost is $220,000, where one or both suffer 
from chronic disease, as compared to $260,000 for a couple free of chronic 
disease.108 These estimates suggest the healthy spend nearly 20% more over a 
lifetime than those with chronic disease.109 Those in poorer health also have less 
                                                 
99 See, e.g., NEUMAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 2 (reporting mean spending of $2761 under 100%, 
$4001 at 100% to 199%, $4406 from 200% to 300%, and $4997 above 400% of FPL, including long-
term care spending). 
100 FRONSTIN ET AL., supra note 1.  
101 Actuarial Life Table, 2007, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ 
STATS/table4c6.html. Twenty-five percent of men would live to eighty-seven and women to ninety, 
and 10% of men would live until ninety-one and women to ninety-five. Id.  
102 FRONSTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 9. These are the estimates for beneficiaries with 
wraparound Medicare coverage.  
103 See, e.g. NEUMAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 2 (reporting a mean spending of $4281 for a 
woman and $3765 for a man and median spending of $2908 and $2532, all for 2005 and including 
long-term care). Because this study included long-term care expenditures, it is less useful to us as a 
benchmark.  
104 Hurd & Rohwedder, supra note 66, at 9 (describing persistence of bad health/high spending 
and good health/low spending as present but not perfect); see NEUMAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 2 
(finding health to be an important factor for high annual costs); Webb & Zhivan, supra note 66, at 15 
(concluding that “current good health provides only a very limited guarantee of future good health”). 
105 KFF CHARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 71 fig.7.3 (including long-term care costs). 
106 WEI SUN ET AL., CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH BOS. COLL., NO. 10-8, DOES STAYING HEALTHY 
REDUCE YOUR LIFETIME HEALTHCARE COSTS? (2010).  
107 Id. at 2 (reporting that in 2009, excluding nursing home care, a household where the husband 
is age seventy to seventy-four and in good health will spend $6000 on average compared to $7416 for 
a household with a husband not in good health—defined as having ever been diagnosed with a chronic 
disease). 
108 Id. at 1 (including home health and nursing home costs, but not costs of assisted living 
facilities or long-term care insurance premiums). 
109 See id.  
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asset accumulation, both because of depletion and because of slower asset 
accumulation, which could explain lower spending.110 
Likewise, it is not clear what effect, if any, advancing age has on annual out-of-
pocket costs, except that proximity to death corresponds with higher annual 
healthcare costs.111 Marshall et al. found average expenses in the last year of life of 
$11,618 with out-of-pocket spending as high as $29,335 at the ninetieth percentile 
and $94,310 at the ninety-ninth percentile, including long-term care.112 Average 
annual healthcare costs do increase with cohort age113—for the average cohort 
member—but studies suggest this increase largely reflects increased probability of 
death and high end-of-life costs, due to chronic disease and long-term care costs, 
that are more common for any one member of a cohort at older ages.114 For example, 
Hurd and Rohwedder report median annual spending for care (excluding premiums) 
for a non-institutionalized sixty-five to sixty-nine year old of $720, seventy-five to 
seventy-nine year old of $880, and an over eighty-five year old of $950, based on 
HRS data.115 Thus, studies show a slow upward incline of average spending for 
cohorts at older ages. But age may be unreliable for predicting individual spending, 
unless used to gauge proximity to death. 
In sum, we know certain factors are predictive of higher healthcare spending, 
including sex (women spend as much as 40% more than men, excluding long-term 
care), higher income or wealth (can more than double spending), poor health status 
(higher for annual spending but lower by as much as 20% for lifetime spending), and 
proximity to death. We consider below whether respondents’ answers vary as expert 
studies report actual spending does based on these demographic factors.  
C. UNCERTAINTY IN HEALTHCARE COSTS  
To a large degree, any one individual’s future costs are unpredictable. The 
median benchmark estimates, discussed above, belie the variability in costs among 
retirees and over time, based on three major sources of uncertainty: the skewed 
distribution of costs among retirees based on individual health experience, 
unexpected excess healthcare cost growth, and policy uncertainty.  
                                                 
110 James M. Poterba et al., The Asset Cost of Poor Health 18-19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 16389, 2010).  
111 See generally Marshall et al., supra note 83, (finding that “out-of-pocket expenditures are 
often elusive” and represent a large drain on financial resources, especially for households nearing 
death). See also Webb & Zhivan, supra note 66, at 7; Meena Seshamani & Alastair M. Gray, A 
Longitudinal Study of the Effects of Age and Time to Death on Hospital Costs, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 
217, 230 (2004) (“Average hospital costs increased seven-fold in the last three years of life, compared 
to a 30% increase from age 65-80.”). 
112 Marshall et al., supra note 83, at 2. This study uses data from HRS exit interviews and 
normalizes spending to a twelve month period. The authors seek to omit outliers that might be 
erroneous. A large part of this spending, particularly at the high ends of the distribution, is for long-
term care, which is beyond the scope of this study. 
113 Micah Hartman et al., U.S. Health Spending by Age, Selected Years Through 2004, 27 
HEALTH AFF. W2 (Nov. 2007) (with respect to total expenditures, insured and out-of-pocket, showing 
a doubling from cohorts ages sixty-five to seventy-four to ages seventy-five to eighty-four, and a 
tripling between ages sixty-five to seventy-four and over eighty-five); see also Webb & Zhivan, supra 
note 66, at 7 (reporting increasing out-of-pocket spending by age). But see Susan T. Stewart, Do Out-
of-Pocket Health Expenditures Rise with Age Among Older Americans?, 44 GERONTOLOGIST 48, 50-
51 (2004) (reporting generally no increase in out-of-pocket costs when long-term care spending is 
excluded and certain costs, including hospital costs, decrease). 
114 Webb & Zhivan, supra note 66, at 2, 22.  
115 Hurd & Rohwedder, supra note 66, at 17. Their mean and median estimates based on MCBS 
and MEPS data are lower. Id.  
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1. Individual Health Experience 
The distribution of healthcare costs is notoriously skewed with a long, 
expensive tail for some.116 The top 5% of Medicare beneficiaries account for 43% of 
total spending, and the top 25% account for 85% of spending.117 The demographic 
factors discussed above only predict 20% to 25% of variability in spending,118 which 
means there is significant unpredictable spending variability among retirees.  
Studies suggest that more intensive users of healthcare—those at the seventy-
fifth or ninetieth percentile of spending among retirees—can easily spend two to 
three times the amount the typical retiree spends. Johnson and Mommaerts estimate, 
for example, annual out-of-pocket costs in 2010 that range from $1909 at the twenty-
fifth percentile to $2583 at the median to $5854 at the ninetieth percentile (see Table 
One).119 Studies that include estimates at the ninety-ninth percentile report annual 
out-of-pocket spending of over $20,000 for the very highest spenders.120 With regard 
to total lifetime retiree spending, the EBRI study estimates median lifetime retiree 
healthcare costs of $65,000 for a man retiring in 2010 with wraparound Medicare 
coverage.121 At the seventy-fifth and ninetieth percentile of spending, the estimates 
increase to $118,000 and $187,000—a near doubling to tripling of costs above the 
median.122 For a woman, the variability is slightly less, ranging from median 
spending of $93,000 to $213,000 at ninetieth percentile, which still represents over a 
doubling.123 For the most part, it is impossible to know in advance which individuals 
will have more or less intensive needs, posing a challenge for individual retirement 
planning.  
2. Healthcare Cost Growth  
Uncertainty with respect to medical care cost growth also complicates 
estimating future out-of-pocket exposure. As discussed above, while the Medicare 
Trustees’ long-term projection of Medicare cost growth has been GDP plus 1% in 
recent years,124 historical excess healthcare cost growth has been over 2% in recent 
decades—2.5% for Medicare and 1.9% overall from 1975 to 2008.125 For excess cost 
growth to be closer to 1% or less in the future, a number of the Trustees’ 
assumptions must prove true, including the questionable assumption that Congress 
                                                 
116 Marc L. Berk & Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration of Health Care Expenditures, Revisited, 
20 HEALTH AFF. 9 (2001).  
117 See James D. Reschovsky et al., Following the Money: Factors Associated with the Cost of 
Treating High-Cost Medicare Beneficiaries, 46 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 998 (2011). 
118 Newhouse, supra note 22, at 1256. 
119 JOHNSON & MOMMAERTS, supra note 6, at 11. 
120 Hurd & Rohwedder, supra note 66, at 17 (explaining that based on HRS data for a retiree in 
the sixty-five to sixty-nine age bracket, they estimate $720 at the median and $21,950 at the ninety-
ninth percentile; for those eighty-five and older, spending is $950 at the median to $25,150 at the 
ninety-ninth percentile).  
121 FRONSTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 9. 
122 Id.  
123 Id. For a couple turning sixty-five in 2009, one study estimated a doubling of expenditures 
from $260,000 on average to $570,000 at the ninety-fifth percentile, including nursing home care but 
excluding the costs of assisted living facilities. Webb & Zhivan, supra note 66, at 20. Excluding all 
nursing home care, the average and ninety-fifth percentile estimates were $197,000 and $311,000—
still an over 50% increase from the mean to the ninety-fifth percentile. Id. 
124 BDS. OF TRUSTEES 2011, supra note 75, at 202-04.  
125 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 27, at 27 (reporting that from 1975-2008, excess cost 
growth in Medicare was 2.5%, in Medicaid was 2.0%, in all other was 1.8%, and overall was 1.9%). 
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does not override policies that limit increases in the physician fee schedule.126 In 
addition, PPACA created a new entity, known as the Independent Payment Advisory 
Board (IPAB), tasked with managing Medicare expenditure to keep cost growth to 
under GDP plus 1%,127 but it faces constraints that might impede its ability to 
accomplish this goal,128 assuming it survives Congressional attempts at repealing 
it.129 
If healthcare costs were to grow at GDP plus 2% instead of GDP plus 1%, the 
out-of-pocket costs of an average retiree would increase on the order of 10% over 
the lifetime of a typical retiree with an additional increase of approximately 10% for 
every additional percentage point by which out-of-pocket costs exceed GDP growth. 
This unexpected medical care cost growth is unlikely to have as dramatic effects as 
intensive individual medical care needs, but it is significant nonetheless.  
3. Policy Instability 
Finally, policy changes, especially those made to the Medicare program, will 
shape future retiree costs in significant and unpredictable ways. With Medicare costs 
escalating as a percent of the total federal budget, from just over 2% a decade ago to 
3.6% in 2010,130 Medicare reform is a priority for policymakers in both parties.  
Some reform proposals, including that in Representative Paul Ryan’s “Path to 
Prosperity” fiscal year 2013 budget plan that the House of Representatives passed in 
March of 2012,131 attempt to curb future federal budget spending on healthcare by 
converting Medicare from a defined-benefit to a defined-contribution program.132 
This approach fixes federal government spending to the amount of a “premium 
support payment” per retiree, which retirees can use to buy a private insurance plan. 
If premium support payments grow more slowly than healthcare costs over time,133 
as anticipated, their relative value will decrease. Many retirees will be able to afford 
only less comprehensive insurance plans and will face greater risk of high exposure 
in any one year. 
As one potential indicator of how significant such changes might be, the 
Congressional Budget Office in 2011 estimated (admittedly with quite stylized 
assumptions) that Representative Ryan’s Medicare reform proposal could more than 
                                                 
126 See Bruce C. Vladeck, Fixing Medicare’s Physician Payment System, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1955 (2010). 
127 Henry Aaron, The Independent Payment Advisory Board – Congress’s “Good Deed,” 364 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2377 (2011).  
128 Id. at 2378-79.  
129 Editorial, We Thought They Were Worried About Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2012, at A30.  
130 KFF CHARTBOOK, supra note 4, at 79.  
131 H.R. Con. Res. 112, 112th Cong. (2012) (proposing to replace Medicare with a “premium 
support” program); see also HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PROPOSED CHANGES TO MEDICARE IN 
THE “PATH TO PROSPERITY” 1 (April 2011) (summarizing terms of Paul Ryan plan). 
132 PAUL RYAN, HOUSE BUDGET COMM., THE PATH TO PROSPERITY: A BLUEPRINT FOR 
AMERICAN RENEWAL 52-55 (2012), available at http://budget.house.gov/fy2013prosperity/. Several 
plans, including Representative Ryan’s and legislation introduced by Senators Lieberman and Coburn 
in 2011, also propose to increase the Medicare eligibility age to sixty-seven. Id.; see also Rick Unger, 
The Coburn-Lieberman Medicare Proposal - The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, FORBES (June 29, 
2011, 12:46 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2011/06/29/the-coburn-lieberman-medicare-
proposal-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/. 
133 RYAN, supra note 132, at 53.  
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double a typical retiree’s share of healthcare costs by 2022 with further increases in 
the following decade.134  
The fate of current policies that limit retiree out-of-pocket spending, including 
Part D and PPACA, will also greatly affect future exposure. PPACA is expected to 
reduce retiree out-of-pocket expenditures on net.135 Most importantly, it will 
decrease out-of-pocket spending for prescription drugs under Medicare Part D by 
$43 billion over ten years, by closing the so-called “donut hole,” a gap in Part D 
coverage of prescription drug spending.136 An EBRI estimate suggests that while 
PPACA has little impact on someone with median prescription drug expenditures, it 
decreases out-of-pocket spending for someone in the ninetieth percentile of spending 
by as much as one-third.137 Other PPACA policies eliminate cost-sharing for 
preventive care138 and intend to slow Medicare cost growth overall, such as through 
the creation of the IPAB, discussed above, and through delivery reforms.139 
Uncertainties exist regarding whether these policies will actually save money and, if 
they do, whether they will reduce out-of-pocket costs or simply lower federal 
outlays, preserving current levels of out-of-pocket spending.  
On the other hand, certain PPACA policies could increase out-of-pocket 
expenditures for retirees. For example, PPACA reduces the rates Medicare will pay 
to private Medicare Advantage plans, which were historically compensated at rates 
about 10% higher than what the government spent for Medicare fee-for-service 
beneficiaries.140 CBO estimates that this reduction will cause enrollment in Medicare 
Advantage plans to drop to 9.1 million enrollees in 2019 (compared to a pre-reform 
estimate of 13.9 million).141 Since these plans can protect retirees relatively well 
against out-of-pocket exposure, their reduction would likely result in higher 
expenditures for some beneficiaries. Over time, PPACA might hasten the already 
ongoing erosion of ESI retiree supplemental plans,142 through policies including the 
                                                 
134 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LONG-TERM ANALYSIS OF A BUDGET PROPOSAL BY CHAIRMAN 
RYAN (2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/121xx/doc12128/04 
-05-ryan_letter.pdf.  
135 ROBERT BERENSON & JOHN HOLOHAN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. & URBAN INSTIT., 
HOW WILL THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AFFECT SENIORS?: TIMELY 
ANALYSIS OF HEALTH POLICY ISSUES 1-2 (2010).  
136 Id. at 2. Part D led to a reduction of $180 in annual out-of-pocket costs for the median 
participant and $800 at the ninetieth percentile. ENGELHARDT & GRUBER, supra note 85, at 3-4. Prior 
to PPACA, after just over $3000 in spending, retirees would enter the so-called “donut hole” in 
coverage where they had to pay 100% of the next $3610 in spending before reaching the “catastrophic 
coverage” level ($6440 in 2010), after which Medicare and the plan together pay 95% of the costs. A 
beneficiary would spend $4550 total out-of-pocket on cost-sharing before qualifying for catastrophic 
coverage. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE PRIMER 7 (2010).  
137 PAUL FRONSTIN ET AL., EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., NO. 8, NOTES: THE IMPACT OF REPEALING 
PPACA ON SAVINGS NEEDED FOR HEALTH EXPENSES FOR PERSONS ELIGIBLE FOR MEDICARE 3 
(2011), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/Notes.Aug11.PPACA-Final.pdf.  
138 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 4104–4108, 
124 Stat. 119, amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
152, 124 Stat. 1029 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395–1396).  
139 See BERENSON & HOLAHAN, supra note 135, at 2-4 (discussing PPACA efforts to reduce 
provider payment rates through the IPAB, Accountable Care Organizations, and other delivery reform 
policies).  
140 Id. at 2. 
141 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COMPARISON OF PROJECTED ENROLLMENT IN MEDICARE 
ADVANTAGE PLANS AND SUBSIDIES FOR EXTRA BENEFITS NOT COVERED BY MEDICARE UNDER 
CURRENT LAW AND UNDER RECONCILIATION LEGISLATION COMBINED WITH H.R. 3590 AS PASSED BY 
THE SENATE (2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/113xx/ 
doc11379/macomparisons.pdf. 
142 See supra note 47. 
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so-called “Cadillac Tax,” an excise tax on high-cost employer-sponsored health 
coverage.143 Starting in 2018, benefits worth more than $10,200 for an individual 
retiree or $27,500 for two or more individuals will be subject to a 40% excise tax.144 
While this tax may not have a large effect at first because of high thresholds (set 
even higher for retirees than for employees), these thresholds will grow more slowly 
than healthcare costs so that a larger portion of benefits are taxed over time.145 The 
result might be increased cost-shifting to retirees or decreased availability of ESI for 
retirees.  
The effect of potential policy changes range from small to considerable. Certain 
policy changes, including the plan proposed by Representative Ryan, might rival the 
risks an individual retiree faces of spending more if she incurs individual medical 
expenses at the seventy-fifth percentile of spending, which can result in double 
median expenses.  
III. SURVEY RESULTS 
A. SURVEY SAMPLE AND TREATMENTS 
The goal of our survey was to explore how well individual expectations 
regarding out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures and spending uncertainty match the 
views of experts summarized in Part II of this paper. An abbreviated version of the 
survey questions appears in the Appendix.146 The survey was conducted in February 
and March 2012 through Rand Corporation’s American Life Panel, an internet-based 
vehicle designed to survey representative samples of the national population.147 Of 
2116 respondents solicited, 1704 returned completed surveys, which is a response 
rate of over 80%. Our survey sample was structured to consist of eight age-based 
cohorts from ages forty to eighty. Five groups were under the age of sixty-five, 
principally those pre-retirement, and three groups were sixty-five and older, 
principally those in retirement. The older age cohorts were smaller based on the 
composition of the American Life Panel. As explored below, the segmentation of 
our sample into age cohorts allowed us to explore the extent to which older 
respondents offered different cost estimates than younger respondents. 
Table Three reports basic demographics about the weighted sample, which was 
52% female, 83% white, with an average age of fifty-six years old, an 
                                                 
143 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9001, 124 
Stat. 119, amended by I.R.C. § 49801(b) (West 2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). Other policies could have a similar effect. For example, starting in 2013, the subsidy to 
employers who offer retiree drug coverage will also be taxed, eliminating an exemption created under 
the Medicare Modernization Act and costing employers an additional $233 per retiree on average that 
must be reported as a liability in annual reports. PAUL FRONSTIN, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST, NO. 338, 
ISSUE BRIEF: IMPLICATIONS OF HEALTH REFORM FOR RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS 12 (2010), 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_01-2010_No338_Ret-Hlth.pdf.  
144 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 9001. 
145 Id.  
146 In an effort to validate the form of the survey, we circulated preliminary versions to a number 
of experts and conducted a small pilot survey to ensure that questions were comprehensible and 
answers appropriate. In light of comments received in this process, we revised the survey and 
attempted to reduce the complexity of the questions to tenth grade reading comprehension level or 
lower.  
147 For additional information on the Rand American Life Panel, see Panel Composition, RAND 
AM. LIFE PANEL, https://mmicdata.rand.org/alp/index.php?page=panelcomposition (last updated Sept. 
6, 2012). 
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unemployment rate of 7.1%, and a mean educational achievement level of 10.6, 
equivalent to some college but without obtaining a degree. Table Three also reports 
basic demographic data on key subsamples discussed below based on gender, age 
cohorts, and income quintiles. Unless otherwise indicated, the survey results 
reported in this paper were weighted to be representative of the national population 
in the age cohorts we surveyed.148 
  
                                                 
148 For purposes of the analysis presented here, our survey responses were uniquely weighted to 
ensure that our cohort samples are representative of the national population for non-institutionalized 
individuals over the age of forty. Rand weights are generated using an iterative raking algorithm 
adjusting for gender, education, age, and income. For a general overview of the Rand weights, see 
Panel Weighting, RAND AM. LIFE PANEL, https://mmicdata.rand.org/alp/index.php?page=weights (last 
visited Dec. 14, 2012). 
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Table Three: Basic Demographics of Total Sample and Key Subsamples 
(weighted data) 
  
N Age Female Married Income Levels* 
Unemployment 
Rate White 
Highest Educational 
Achievement** 
Total Sample 1704   
 Mean 56.5 0.52 0.67 10.9 0.07 0.83 10.6 
 Standard Deviation 10.5 0.50 0.47 4.2 0.26 0.38 2.4 
 Gender    
Male 736   
 Mean 56.2 0.00 0.74 11.3 0.08 0.84 10.6 
 Standard Deviation 10.0 0.00 0.42 3.9 0.26 0.35 2.3 
Female 968   
 Mean 56.6 1.00 0.60 10.6 0.06 0.82 10.5 
 Standard Deviation 11.0 0.00 0.51 4.4 0.25 0.40 2.5 
 Age Cohort   
40-44 210   
 Mean 41.9 0.51 0.71 10.8 0.11 0.76 10.5 
 Standard Deviation 1.3 0.45 0.41 3.6 0.28 0.39 2.0 
45-49 218   
 Mean 47.2 0.51 0.66 11.1 0.11 0.76 10.1 
 Standard Deviation 1.2 0.45 0.42 4.0 0.28 0.38 2.2 
50-54 237   
 Mean 52.0 0.51 0.68 10.9 0.10 0.76 10.6 
 Standard Deviation 1.3 0.46 0.43 4.3 0.28 0.39 2.1 
55-59 249   
 Mean 57.0 0.52 0.66 11.5 0.07 0.85 11.0 
 Standard Deviation 1.4 0.50 0.48 4.0 0.26 0.36 2.2 
60-64 258   
 Mean 61.8 0.52 0.69 11.2 0.05 0.87 10.9 
 Standard Deviation 1.6 0.55 0.50 4.6 0.24 0.37 2.7 
65-69 255   
 Mean 66.9 0.60 0.64 11.0 0.03 0.92 10.8 
 Standard Deviation 1.7 0.56 0.54 4.4 0.20 0.30 2.8 
70-74 168   
 Mean 71.8 0.50 0.57 10.2 0.00 0.92 10.3 
 Standard Deviation 1.5 0.55 0.54 4.0 0.06 0.30 2.7 
75-80 109   
 Mean 77.2 0.53 0.65 9.4 0.00 0.90 10.0 
 Standard Deviation 1.7 0.54 0.51 3.9 0.00 0.32 2.8 
 Income Quintile***    
First Quintile 354   
 Mean 56.8 0.56 0.41 4.6 0.13 0.68 9.3 
 Standard Deviation 10.6 0.48 0.47 1.9 0.33 0.45 1.9 
Second Quintile 438   
 Mean 57.9 0.56 0.58 9.6 0.07 0.81 9.8 
 Standard Deviation 11.8 0.50 0.50 1.2 0.26 0.39 2.2 
Third Quintile 267   
 Mean 56.4 0.51 0.77 12.5 0.06 0.84 10.7 
 Standard Deviation 10.6 0.51 0.43 0.5 0.24 0.38 2.2 
Fourth Quintile 451   
 Mean 55.5 0.50 0.80 14.4 0.05 0.91 11.4 
 Standard Deviation 9.5 0.50 0.40 0.5 0.21 0.29 2.2 
Fifth Quintile 191   
 Mean 54.6 0.43 0.92 16.3 0.03 0.93 12.6 
 Standard Deviation 8.9 0.50 0.28 0.5 0.17 0.26 2.2 
 
* Under the American Life Panel income classification system. 4 represents household incomes of $10,000 to $12,499; 5 represents $12,500 to 
$14,499; 6 represents $15,000 to $19,999; 7 represents $20,000 to $24,999; 8 represents $25,000 to $29,999; 9 represents $30,000 to $34,999; 
10 represents $35,000 to $39,999; 11 represents $40,000 to $49,999; 12 represents $50,000 to $59,999; 13 represents $60,000 to $74,999; 14 
represents $75,000 to $99,999; 15 represents $100,000 to $124,999; 16 represents $125,000 to $199,999; and 17 represents $200,000 or more.  
** Under the ALP education classification system, 9 reflects a high school graduate; 10 reflects some college but no degree; 11 reflects an 
associate degree in a college occupational/vocational program; 12 reflects an associate degree in a college academic program; and 13 reflects a 
bachelor’s degree. 
*** Respondents in the first income quintile had household incomes of less than $25,000; those in the second quintile household incomes 
between $25,000 and $49,999; those in the third quintile household incomes between $50,000 and $74,999; those in the fourth quintile 
household incomes between $75,000 and $124,999; and those in the fifth quintile household incomes $125,000 and higher. 
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Our survey questions focused on respondents’ evaluation of their own out-of-
pocket healthcare costs in retirement and the components that determine those 
costs.149 We asked all respondents to estimate their monthly expenditures for out-of-
pocket healthcare costs in retirement. We also asked each respondent to estimate 
how much someone like himself or herself would need to save by age sixty-five in 
order to have enough money to cover all out-of-pocket healthcare costs during 
retirement. The first of these measures was intended to solicit estimates of an 
average monthly budget for out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures in retirement, 
while the second measure was an attempt to solicit a lump sum estimate of total out-
of-pocket expenditures throughout retirement. As discussed above, experts employ 
similar approaches to measuring out-of-pocket expenditures, with our monthly 
budget estimates tracking expert estimates of annual costs and our lump sum 
estimates being analogous to the experts’ measure of the NPV of total lifetime 
healthcare spending from age sixty-five to the end of life. Among other things, we 
were interested in exploring whether the quality of individual estimates of out-of-
pocket expenditures would differ based on whether the estimates were expressed in 
terms of monthly budgets or lump sum costs. We also asked some of our 
respondents to estimate the separate components that determine these costs, such as 
likelihood of insurance coverage and premiums for Medicare and supplemental 
insurance coverage. Our goal was to ascertain whether respondents were more or 
less attuned to any of the component parts that together determine total out-of-
pocket spending. We asked respondents to exclude long-term care costs when 
estimating out-of-pocket costs for consistency with the benchmark studies.150  
In the last section of the survey, we included a module on risk assessment, 
where, using two separate formulations, we asked respondents to assess the 
potentially important sources of variation in individual retiree healthcare costs 
discussed above: individual health and medical needs in retirement, unanticipated 
healthcare cost growth during their retirement, and changes in policy affecting 
Medicare and other government programs.  
To facilitate our analysis of results, we included a few preliminary questions 
about respondents’ self-assessments of their own current health status, familiarity 
with financial planning and insurance coverage of health costs in retirement, and life 
expectancies. Towards the back of the survey, we also included several questions 
about long-term healthcare services, which we report in a separate paper. 
Finally, to ascertain how sensitive responses on out-of-pocket retiree healthcare 
costs might be to how our questions were framed, we divided our respondents into 
                                                 
149 In our survey, we offered respondents the following guidance about the kinds of costs we 
were interested in:  
 “In this survey, we want to find out how much you expect to pay for healthcare in 
retirement. We are interested in your out-of-pocket costs. Out-of-pocket costs are any 
expenses that you pay yourself. In addition to any direct payments, these costs include 
insurance premiums for government programs and other health insurance plans. Out-of-
pocket costs also cover deductibles and co-pays. Out-of-pocket costs do not include 
payments made on your behalf or reimbursed by government programs or other 
insurance plans. In all cases, we are asking about your own personal healthcare costs in 
retirement. Do not include healthcare costs of other members of your household. Unless 
otherwise indicated, please do not include in your estimates the cost of long-term 
residential health-care services (such as extended stays in nursing homes) or premiums 
for long-term healthcare insurance. Some questions ask for estimates about costs in the 
future. Please do not attempt to adjust your estimates to reflect price increases from 
overall inflation. Just make your estimates using the value of money today.” 
150 For survey instructions with regard to excluding long-term care cost, see supra note 149. 
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three basic treatment groups with varying levels of anchoring information. In 
Treatment A, respondents answered a straightforward set of three questions about 
out-of-pocket healthcare costs: How much did they expect to spend on average each 
month for out-of-pocket costs in retirement? How much did they expect to spend per 
month on out-of-pocket costs during the final year of their lives? How much did they 
think someone like them would need to save by age sixty-five in order to have 
enough money to cover all out-of-pocket healthcare costs throughout retirement? In 
the two additional treatments, the hypothesis we hoped to explore was whether 
respondents’ assessments of out-of-pocket cost might be affected—and presumably 
increased—by prompting them to think about several different components of 
healthcare costs. To that end, we asked Treatment B respondents several additional 
questions about their expectations regarding the type of health insurance coverage 
they anticipated having during retirement and also about the monthly insurance 
premiums they expected to pay for that coverage. We also asked Treatment B 
respondents to estimate monthly out-of-pocket costs in retirement at three separate 
ages: sixty-five, seventy-five, and eighty-five, as well as the final year of their lives. 
Finally, in Treatment C, we asked respondents the same additional questions as we 
asked of Treatment B respondents and also provided additional information about 
average life expectancies, typical insurance premiums, ordinary ratios of premiums 
to out-of-pocket expenditures on medical care, and projected increases in medical 
healthcare costs above inflation to see whether such anchoring would influence 
respondents’ assessments of their own out-of-pocket costs. As we discuss below, 
these treatments had a modest effect in some places but less overall effect than we 
had hypothesized.  
B. ESTIMATING OUT-OF-POCKET RETIREE EXPENDITURES  
1. Estimates of Components of Cost (Insurance Coverage and Premiums) 
Future out-of-pocket spending can depend in part on future insurance coverage 
and insurance premiums. We begin with an overview of our respondents’ 
expectations with regard to these insurance components.  
a. Insurance Coverage 
We examined respondents’ expectations regarding insurance coverage in 
retirement to test the hypothesis that unrealistic expectations regarding coverage 
might lead to underestimation of out-of-pocket obligations and found that 
expectations align roughly with expert estimates of coverage levels with a few 
exceptions noted below. We asked respondents to estimate the likelihood that 
particular insurance programs would provide the respondent coverage for “at least a 
portion of your healthcare expenses at some point in retirement.”151 Table Four 
presents a summary of responses overall and also by age cohort.152  
                                                 
151 The survey introduction to these questions read as follows: 
“Many different government programs and insurance plans can cover healthcare 
expenses of retirees. With all these choices, many people are confused which plans and 
programs will provide them coverage. The next questions ask how likely you think it is 
that particular government programs and insurance plans will cover at least a portion of 
your healthcare expenses at some point in retirement. If you are certain that you will be 
covered, you should click the ruler on 100%. If you are certain that you will not be 
covered, you should click the ruler at 0%. If you think you may be covered but are not 
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Table Four: Retiree Health Insurance Coverage Expectations by Cohort and All 
Respondents 
(estimated likelihood of coverage under various insurance programs; estimates in percentages) 
  Medicare Medicaid Employer-Sponsored Medigap 
 N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Age Cohort     
40-44 128 55 29 40 32 33 32 25 26 
45-49 157 61 30 44 35 24 32 26 31 
50-54 156 68 29 45 34 29 34 26 27 
55-59 173 74 22 47 34 35 38 32 30 
60-64 158 82 26 30 37 36 43 32 37 
65-69 176 89 22 26 37 41 46 29 41 
70-74 106 88 24 25 38 33 46 34 43 
75-80 75 92 22 28 41 29 44 35 46 
All 
Respondents 1154 73 29 38 36 32 38 29 34 
Coverage from 
Literature 
Review  
95 percent 15 percent* 33 percent * 17 percent* 
* Reflects Percentage of Coverage of Medicare Beneficiaries. 
 
In general, overall responses to these coverage questions reflected actual 
coverage levels. Respondents correctly identified Medicare as the program with the 
highest expected coverage levels (with a mean response of 73%, as compared to 
95% in fact).153 Among the other categories, expectations regarding ESI coverage 
(mean response of 32%) were close to the 33% of Medicare beneficiaries reported in 
the literature review to have employer-sponsored supplemental coverage. In contrast, 
the mean responses for Medicaid (38%) and Medigap (29%) both were in a range of 
close to double actual reported coverage levels from our literature review (15% and 
17%, respectively).154  
The younger age cohorts’ estimates of expected Medicare coverage were much 
lower than current levels of participation in the program.155 For the forty to forty-
                                                                                                                      
sure, click on the scale on the point on the ruler that best reflects your assessment of the 
likelihood that you may be covered or type the number reflecting that likelihood in the 
box below.” 
152 We also surveyed respondents about their expectations regarding coverage from Veterans 
Administration programs but do not report those results in this analysis. 
153 The mean response can be interpreted as the expected coverage level across all respondents 
because we asked each respondent to report the likelihood of personal coverage.  
154 While the benchmarks in the literature review might be slightly low, especially with regard to 
Medigap for reasons discussed above, any underreporting of Medicaid or Medigap coverage would be 
small at most.  
155 Here, and elsewhere throughout this Article, we make comparisons between responses of 
younger and older cohorts. Where differences are noted, we tested for statistical significance using a 
Hodges-Lehman non-parametric estimator for the median differences across groups, incorporating 
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four age cohort, the average estimate of Medicare coverage was just over 55%. In 
contrast, respondents sixty-five and over estimated a nearly 90% or higher likelihood 
of coverage, quite close to actual current coverage levels (95%). In contrast, the 
younger cohorts over-estimated the likelihood of Medicaid coverage (at over 40% 
likelihood) as compared to actual current coverage levels (15%) and the expectations 
of older respondents (at under 30% likelihood). The responses of younger cohorts 
might reflect some pragmatic assessment about the availability of Medicare in the 
future156 or confusion on the part of younger respondents about the differences 
between Medicare and Medicaid, notwithstanding the definition of Medicare 
included in our survey. Even for respondents over sixty-five, expectations regarding 
the likelihood of Medicaid coverage (in excess of 25%) substantially exceeded 
actual coverage levels for retirees (15%).157 
 Our respondents expressed stable expectations across age cohorts regarding 
coverage from ESI programs, even though most industry experts assume that levels 
of employer-sponsored coverage will decline over time. As discussed below, a 
persistent feature of our survey responses with respect to comprehensive measures of 
retiree healthcare costs was the tendency of young cohorts to give quite similar 
responses as older respondents, suggesting that younger respondents may not be 
anticipating predicted changes in costs or coverage in the coming decades.  
Overall, our findings here suggest that respondents’ expectations with regard to 
future insurance coverage are not so far off as to drive large scale misestimation of 
future out-of-pocket spending. 
b. Premium Costs of Insurance 
Where respondents from Treatments B and C indicated they expected to 
maintain a form of insurance coverage, we also asked what premium cost they 
anticipated paying to maintain such coverage in retirement. As above with regard to 
insurance coverage, we found that estimates of premiums roughly approximated 
actual premiums for both Medicare and supplemental insurance coverage. Table 
Five reports the respondent expectations for total Medicare premiums, Medigap 
premiums, and ESI premiums. Here and elsewhere below, we report results in terms 
of key percentiles of responses (the tenth percentile, twenty-fifth percentile, median, 
seventy-fifth percentile, and ninetieth percentile), as well as mean and standard 
deviation. The use of percentiles is helpful in interpreting results because responses 
                                                                                                                      
probabilistic weighting of data. We used non-parametric tests because in many instances the 
distributions of responses were skewed. Unless otherwise indicated, the differences were significant at 
the 99% confidence level. 
156 On the other hand, as discussed below, the younger cohorts do not estimate consistently 
higher levels of out-of-pocket expenses than other cohorts of the sort that one would expect if younger 
cohorts were consciously anticipating less generous Medicare coverage in the future.  
157 For those respondents in Treatment B and C who indicated that they thought there was some 
probability that they would maintain Medicare coverage at some point in retirement, we asked 
whether they expect to maintain Part D Prescription Drug Coverage or to participate in Medicare 
Advantage. Respondents overwhelming reported that they expect to maintain Part D Prescription Drug 
coverage (quite consistent with the 60% coverage levels reported in the expert literature). Of 
respondents giving definitive answers, over 75% indicated that they expected to have Part D coverage 
(611 of 814). Respondents reported greater uncertainty about Medicare Advantage participation, with 
nearly half of all respondents reporting that they did not know or had not decided about the issue. 
Those giving a firm answer to the question reported a good deal higher level of Medicare Advantage 
take-up (281 of 640 or nearly 44%) than the literature review indicates is currently the case (25% of 
current Medicare beneficiaries). The figures reported in this footnote are not weighted. 
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to questions that allowed open-ended estimates of dollar amounts resulted in some 
high outliers that skew sample means and inflate standard deviations.158  
 
Table Five: Insurance Premiums Estimates for Respondents in Treatments B and 
Treatment C* 
 N p10 p25 Median p75 p90 Mean SD  
Ranges 
Suggested in 
Anchoring for 
Treatment C** 
Treatment B           
Total Medicare 
Premiums 573 $30 $98 $ 120 $250 $500 $211 253  n.a. 
Medigap 
Premiums 568 $0 $0 $50 $150 $206 $106 173  n.a. 
Employer-
Sponsored 
Premiums 
566 $0 $0  $55 $200 $450 $149 255  n.a. 
Treatment C           
Total Medicare 
Premiums 562 $50 $100 $135 $200 $350 $259 1019  
$96 to $115 for 
typical basic 
Medicare 
premium plus an 
average of $40 
for typical Part 
D Prescription 
Drug Coverage 
Medigap 
Premiums 229 $25 $50 $100 $185 $250 $135 141  
Considerable 
variation in 
policy types, but 
majority of 
monthly 
Medigap 
premiums range 
between $50 and 
$200 
Employer-
Sponsored 
Premiums 
342 $0 $80 $165 $200 $330 $300 1579  
Average 
participant costs 
for those over 65 
roughly $167 
* Estimated Requested Only for Respondents Who Indicate Some Possibility of Maintaining Insurance 
Coverage at Some Point in Retirement. 
** See Appendix for Additional Detail on Anchoring. 
 
Starting with Treatment B respondents, the median expected total premium 
estimates were $120 for total Medicare premiums, $50 for Medigap premiums, and 
$55 for ESI premiums. Current typical premium costs (shown in the right hand 
column of Table Five) for total Medicare costs (basic coverage plus Part D) is 
currently $136 to $155, which means median respondents’ estimates were at most a 
quarter lower than the typical current premiums. Twenty-five percent of respondents 
                                                 
158 For purposes of this and similar tables below, we have not attempted to eliminate outliers in 
the data. See discussion infra note 191. 
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thought their total Medicare premiums would be $98 or lower, and a similar number 
estimated $250 or higher. Because low-income Medicare beneficiaries can benefit 
from premium subsidies through Medicare Savings Programs, described above,159 
and higher income beneficiaries pay more on a sliding scale (as much as $250 or 
higher), these estimates might reflect a reasonable distribution of estimates—a 
possibility that seems plausible based on regression results that show that premium 
estimates were positively correlated with income.160 On the other hand, to the extent 
responses do not align with likely personal expenses, the accuracy at the median 
could communicate the “wisdom of crowds” but might obscure possibly substantial 
ranges in either tail of the distribution for individual respondents.161  
Treatment C responses, where respondents were prompted with basic 
information about actual pricing comparable to the information shown in the right 
hand column, were higher than Treatment B responses.162 In all cases, the median 
Treatment C estimates of premium costs moved up and closer to levels suggested in 
the anchoring information and—perhaps even more pronouncedly—the range of 
variation in responses, as measured by high and low percentiles tightened around the 
medians in almost all cases. So, for example, where the distance between the tenth 
and ninetieth percentiles on the Treatment B responses for total Medicare premiums 
was $470, the distance between the same percentiles on the Treatment C responses 
was only $300.163 Anchoring information provided to Treatment C respondents had 
especially pronounced effects on estimates for Medigap and ESI premiums, 
suggesting that public understanding of the costs of these supplemental policies may 
be less accurate than the knowledge about Medicare premiums.  
Premium estimates also varied by age cohort. Figure One shows distributions of 
expectations for total Medicare premiums by age cohorts for respondents from 
Treatments B and C. As shown in Figure One, the median response (the lower 
number) and ninetieth percentile response (the higher number) both trend downward 
with increasing cohort age. Also, the range between the twenty-fifth and the seventy-
fifth percentile estimates (vertical bar) narrows. This narrowing of ranges with 
increasing age is consistent with the greater confidence and knowledge that older 
participants have about healthcare costs in retirement as they begin to experience 
these costs. The higher median responses of younger cohorts may suggest 
expectations that their Medicare premiums are likely to be higher than those of 
current retirees, but these higher premium estimates do not translate into higher 
expectations of total out-of-pocket cost for younger cohorts, as discussed below. 
 
                                                 
159 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
160 As discussed below, cost estimates among respondents are positively correlated with income 
levels, and this is also true of total Medicare premium estimates, where the median estimate of 
respondents in the top income quintile was $250, whereas the median estimate of those in the bottom 
quintile was $100. These figures are based on a combination of respondents in Treatments B and C. 
161 Note also that mean estimates for these monthly costs skew high, pulled up by a handful of 
respondents who tend to “high-ball” their estimates, perhaps reflecting unwillingness or possibly an 
inability to respond to our estimation requests. 
162 Additional information on our anchoring information is available from the authors. 
163 Whether the difference in medians between Treatment B and Treatment C is meaningful for 
policy purposes is an interesting question. As noted below, Treatment B and Treatment C estimates 
for total out-of-pocket costs were surprisingly similar both to each other and to the estimates of 
Treatment A respondents. So however one judges the difference in median estimates about premiums, 
those differences largely disappear when respondents were asked to estimate overall costs.  
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2. Estimates of Total Out-of-Pocket Expenditures 
We examined two different approaches to measure out-of-pocket retiree 
healthcare costs: average monthly estimates and lump sum estimates. Since much of 
our analysis is based on comparisons to expert benchmarks, we begin by explaining 
how we compare estimates with benchmarks. When evaluating all responses, 
combining all age cohorts, we have chosen to benchmark against expert estimates 
for 2020, on the grounds that 2020 approximates the age of retirement of our median 
respondent (who is 56.5 years old).164 In analyzing monthly cost estimates, we also 
had expert benchmarks for several other future years. Accordingly, in our next layer 
of analysis, we divided our age cohorts into four groups (the forty-year olds, the 
fifty-year olds, the sixty-year olds, and the seventy-year olds) and compared the 
responses for these subsamples to the benchmark that best approximates the 
midpoint of the years the average cohort member will be in retirement (2040, 2030, 
2020, and 2010, respectively), as described in more detail below. For our lump sum 
measures of total costs, we have benchmark estimates only for those retiring in 2020 
and 2010, distinguishing male and female costs, and so we evaluated respondent 
estimates of lump sum costs using gender-based subsamples and gender-based 
benchmarks for 2020. As noted above, in comparing the distribution of our survey 
                                                 
164 One alternative benchmark for these purposes is the 2010 benchmark as the closest reflection 
of current costs, and at several points we refer to that alternative benchmark for illustrative purposes, 
but it is less appropriate for the typical respondent. Yet another approach would have been to use the 
2030 benchmark on the grounds that our average respondent would spend much of retirement in years 
beyond 2020 with higher costs. We discuss below how using the 2030 benchmark would affect the 
analysis in certain respects but decided on 2020 as the primary benchmark, both because our 
benchmarks do not incorporate likely reductions in spending from PPACA (and thus are all arguably 
high) and also because, as also discussed above, it is possible that our instruction to estimate spending 
in present day dollars might have dissuaded respondents from considering growth in healthcare costs.  
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results to these benchmark estimates, we do not mean to suggest that the individual 
respondents were correctly estimating where on the distributions their actual 
individual healthcare expenditures will fall. Rather, we look at how well the 
distribution of our responses aligns with what experts’ estimates suggest is likely to 
occur in the overall population. The likely relationship between individual estimates 
and actual cost experience is a topic we take up in Section 3 below.  
a. Estimating Monthly Out-of-Pocket Costs 
Our basic findings with respect to monthly expenditures are presented in Table 
Six, which reports average monthly cost estimates for all respondents, followed by 
two key subsamples—first age cohorts and then treatment groups.165 In the right 
hand column of Table Six, we summarize benchmark ranges discussed earlier.  
                                                 
165 Treatment A respondents were asked a single question about average monthly costs during 
retirement and for these respondents we used that single estimate in Table Four and accompanying 
figures. Respondents in Treatments B and C were asked to give different monthly estimates for age 
sixty-five, seventy-five, and eighty-five. Respondents who were sixty-five or older were first asked 
for their current average monthly estimates and then also asked to estimate average monthly expenses 
at seventy-five (if they were not yet seventy-five) and eighty-five. For respondents in Treatment B and 
C, average monthly costs is the average of estimates of all of their monthly estimates.  
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Table Six: Average Monthly Cost Estimates 
 N p10 p25 Median p75 p90 Mean SD 
Benchmark 
Ranges from 
Literature 
Review 
All Respondents 1677 $27 $83 $200 $400 $700 $441 4011 
2020 Benchmarks: 
$204 at 25th 
percentile; $274 at 
the Median; $413 
at the 75th 
percentile; and 
$606 at the 90th 
percentile. 
By Age Cohort    
40-44 204 $45 $83 $200 $417 $900 $366 467 
2040 Benchmarks: 
$383 at 25th 
percentile; $518 at 
the Median; $788 
at the 75th 
percentile; and 
$1164 at the 90th 
percentile. 
45-49 213 $27 $90 $225 $500 $770 $560 2071 
50-54 232 $25 $85 $200 $450 $700 $336 474 
2030 Benchmarks: 
$283 at 25th 
percentile; $381 at 
the Median; $571 
at the 75th 
percentile; and 
$838 at the 90th 
percentile. 
55-59 247 $43 $100 $225 $467 $700 $927 10213 
60-64 255 $20 $92 $200 $400 $700 $299 358 
2020 Benchmarks: 
$204 at 25th 
percentile; $274 at 
the Median; $413 
at the 75th 
percentile; and 
$606 at the 90th 
percentile. 
65-69 253 $27 $72 $155 $300 $505 $279 464 
70-74 164 $15 $50 $150 $305 $500 $235 356 
2010 Benchmarks: 
$159 at 25th 
percentile; $215 at 
the Median; $330 
at the 75th 
percentile; and 
$488 at the 90th 
percentile. 
75-80 109 $35 $98 $217 $350 $600 $291 394 
By Treatment    
Treatment A 535 $20 $75 $200 $400 $700 $598 6917 
See 2020 
Benchmarks Above Treatment B 577 $33  $83  $200  $417 $717 $345  467 
Treatment C 565 $30  $98  $217  $400 $633 $389  1440 
i. Monthly Estimates Compared to Benchmarks 
Our key finding with respect to these results concerns the relationship of these 
estimates to the expert benchmarks. The median monthly estimate of all respondents 
was $200, which is not that far beneath the expert benchmark’s estimate of $274 for 
the median retiree healthcare costs in 2020. A closer inspection, however, reveals 
that our survey responses show something of a bimodal distribution in comparison to 
the expert benchmarks. A significant portion of respondent estimates lie above the 
expert median and an even larger portion lie well below.166  
                                                 
166 The left hand column of Figure Two A indicates what share of the responses were below the 
2020 expert benchmark for the twenty-fifth percentile of expenditures; in the next column the share 
that fell between the twenty-fifth percentile and the median; in the next column the share between the 
median and the seventy-fifth percentile; in the next column the share between the seventy-fifth 
percentile and the ninetieth percentile; and in the final column the share above the ninetieth percentile. 
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Figure Two A illustrates this recurring pattern of responses. At the right hand 
side of the distribution—reflecting respondents with higher cost estimates—our 
survey responses track relatively closely the 2020 expert benchmark estimates of 
monthly costs. In Figure Two A, almost a quarter of respondents (24.5%) report 
monthly estimates at or above the expert estimate of spending for someone at the 
seventy-fifth percentile of retirees, with more than 12% of respondents providing 
estimates above the benchmark’s ninetieth percentile. Almost 40% of respondents 
had estimates above the benchmark median of $274. The distributions diverge below 
the benchmark median. Less than 9% of the respondents had monthly estimates in 
the twenty-fifth to fiftieth percentile ranges, which left more than 50% with estimates 
beneath the twenty-fifth percentile of the benchmarks. This bimodal distribution of 
respondent estimates, as measured against the 2020 benchmark, suggests that while 
the median responses of our survey may not fall too substantially beneath the 
benchmark medians, many more of our respondents reported monthly cost estimates 
in the bottom quartile of the benchmark distributions than would be consistent with 
expert views.167  
 
                                                                                                                      
In the unlikely event that our respondents’ estimates perfectly matched this expert benchmark, the 
first three columns of the histogram would equal 75% of respondents and the final two columns would 
sum to 25% (with 15% in the fourth column and 10% in the fifth). 
167 If one were to use the 2010 benchmarks rather than the 2020 benchmarks to make these 
comparisons, similar, though somewhat less pronounced results would be produced. With the 2010 
benchmark, respondents’ median estimate of $200 was only marginally below the benchmark median 
of $215. Slightly over 32% exceeded the seventy-fifth percentile of the 2010 benchmark with 20.4% 
above the ninetieth percentile. On the left hand side of the distribution, 41.9% of respondents had 
estimates below the twenty-fifth percentile. In short, while our survey responses track more closely 
the 2010 benchmarks, the lower end of the survey distribution is still substantially over-represented in 
the bottom quartile of the benchmark. Were one to employ the 2030 benchmark, which had a median 
estimate of $381, only 14.5% of survey responses were above the seventy-fifth percentile and only 
6.2% above the ninetieth percentile. Measured against the 2030 benchmarks, more than 60% of 
respondents had estimates beneath the twenty-fifth percentile. 
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Because monthly expenses will differ based on when a respondent retires, we 
also broke our respondents into four decade-long age groupings and compared 
responses against the Johnson and Mommaerts estimates for 2010, 2020, 2030, and 
2040, based on the year that best approximates the midpoint of when the cohort’s 
members will be in retirement. (See Table Six.) For example, we compared the 
answers of respondents in their fifties to the 2030 benchmarks. The respondent in the 
midpoint of this grouping would be fifty-five and would retire in 2022 (if he or she 
retired at age sixty-five) and live until about 2040. This makes 2030 a rough 
midpoint of the respondent’s years in retirement. For similar reasons, we compared 
answers from respondents in their forties to the 2040 benchmarks, those in their 
sixties to the 2020 benchmarks, and those in their seventies the 2010 benchmarks. 
The results are summarized in Figures Two BCDE. While each of the histograms in 
this figure has the same basic structure—with the largest share of responses located 
in the bottom quartile of the respective benchmark—the combined picture of the 
histograms demonstrates that the younger respondents fall further behind their 
respective benchmarks than do the older cohorts. So, while 46.3% of seventy-year 
old respondents had average monthly estimates in the bottom quartile of the 2010 
benchmark, 69.2% of the forty-year olds had responses in the bottom quartile of the 
2040 benchmark. Similarly, the number of younger respondents at or above the 
benchmark median (as well as the seventy-fifth or ninetieth percentiles) declines 
with decreasing age cohorts. While these responses are subject to various 
interpretations, including the fact that respondents misunderstood the instruction not 
to adjust estimates to reflect overall inflation, younger respondents do not seem to 
have been making upward adjustments in their estimates to match the higher 
healthcare costs that experts predict. The results thus raise potential concerns that a 
significant percentage of those in younger cohorts are underestimating their likely 
healthcare spending in retirement.  
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ii. Monthly Estimates by Age Cohorts 
The distribution of monthly cost estimates across age cohorts, as illustrated in 
Figure Two F, offers another perspective on estimates by age cohorts. In contrast to 
responses discussed above with respect to future Medicare premiums, the median 
respondents in their forties are projecting almost the same average monthly costs as 
those just on the eve of retirement, suggesting that younger respondents are not 
projecting cost increases (or, alternately, might not understand the implications of 
real cost growth in healthcare costs168). While the median estimates of the younger 
cohorts are somewhat higher than those of the oldest cohorts, the differences are 
relatively small. As the extent of those increases is expected to be substantial, these 
responses may suggest an important source of consumer confusion, or at least 
misapprehension about likely healthcare costs in retirement. There does, however, 
seem to be somewhat greater uncertainty about retiree healthcare expenditures for at 
least some of younger cohorts. While the spread between the twenty-fifth and 
seventy-fifth percentiles does not widen markedly with the younger cohorts, the 
ninetieth percentile responses do, suggesting that at least a fraction of respondents in 
the younger cohorts are estimating substantially higher healthcare costs than their 
counterparts in the older cohorts.  
 
 
                                                 
168 An alternative interpretation is that respondents may have understood our instructions to 
express answers in terms of current dollars and not to adjust for general inflation as guidance that they 
should avoid any source of increase in out-of-pocket costs, whether from excess medical care cost 
growth or the reduction of government insurance programs. In this case, our responses might reflect 
confusion regarding general inflation versus other economic or cost growth. 
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iii. Other Features of Monthly Estimates  
In contrast with the premium estimates discussed above, respondent estimates 
are relatively stable across treatment groups. As reported in Table Six, while 
Treatment C responses showed a modest narrowing in distribution similar to the 
narrowing noted above for their estimates of premiums, the treatment groups 
provided similar estimates, regardless of whether they were posed as simple 
questions about out-of-pocket costs in Treatment A or given a good deal of 
additional framing and anchoring in Treatments B and C. Median responses did not 
differ greatly across treatments. 
Our survey questions on monthly cost estimates also included two extensions 
that explored the extent to which respondents expected their monthly costs to vary 
over the course of retirement. First, we asked all respondents to make separate 
monthly cost estimates for the last year of their lives. Respondents overwhelmingly 
estimated that they would have higher monthly costs in their final year.169 The 
median estimate was $350 as compared with a median estimate for average monthly 
costs of $200 for all respondents. We also calculated the ratio of individual 
responses on this question to their average monthly cost estimates and determined 
that the median ratio was 1.46 or nearly 50% higher than the average monthly cost 
estimate. This is similar to, though not as extreme as, estimates based on expert data 
of a ratio of two, or nearly 100% higher.170  
For respondents in Treatments B and C, we also compared individual 
respondent estimates of monthly costs at age eighty-five as opposed to monthly costs 
at age sixty-five to gauge their understanding of how costs are likely to change 
toward the end of their lives. While one quarter of respondents projected monthly 
costs at eighty-five at or below levels at age sixty-five, the median response 
indicated a projected increase of 33%, which is in line with the ratio of cost 
increases reported above in our literature review for costs experienced by the 
average member of an eighty-five-year old cohort, as compared to the average 
member of a sixty-five-year old cohort.171 So, again on this dimension, the typical 
response was consistent with expert views. These results—in conjunction with the 
findings on overall monthly estimates above—suggest that at least some people do 
have some understanding of future healthcare expenditures, more so than we 
hypothesized we would find.  
b. Lump Sum Estimates 
As an alternative measure of retiree healthcare costs, we asked all respondents 
to estimate the amount of money that a person similar to the respondent would need 
to accumulate by the age of sixty-five in order to save enough money to pay for their 
total expected out-of-pocket costs for healthcare in retirement.172 Our goal here was 
                                                 
169 There is a risk of demand effect, namely that inquiring about last year costs suggests that such 
costs will be higher. Even if demand effect is occurring here, it is nonetheless interesting that the 
magnitude of estimates is close to experts’ estimates and that, when prompted, people intuit higher 
costs in their final year.  
170 This expert ratio is calculated based on the estimate in the Marshall study of the median last 
year of life ($5061) divided by the overall median annual estimate in the Johnson and Mommaerts 
study ($2583). Marshall et al., supra note 83, at 37; see also JOHNSON & MOMMAERTS, supra note 6, 
at 11. 
171 A comparable increase of 33% can be seen in the median estimates from the Hurd & 
Rohwedder study of $720 for a sixty-five to sixty-nine year old and $950 for an over eighty-five year 
old. See Hurd & Rohwedder, supra note 66. 
172 The actual question read as follows:  
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to solicit savings targets that the respondents would associate with the amount 
needed on the eve of retirement to cover expected healthcare costs in retirement.173  
Many different factors could affect an estimate of lifetime spending: estimates 
of monthly spending, projections of life expectancy, and ability to toggle between 
monthly and lifetime estimates, considering real cost growth. Even if a respondent 
estimates monthly spending well, she might underestimate her life expectancy and 
the number of years of future spending. Further, recent financial literacy research 
illustrates that people have difficulty translating between periodic and lump sum 
payments, suggesting that our respondents might similarly struggle.174 Accordingly, 
in designing our survey, we hypothesized that respondents’ estimates of lump sum 
costs might be significantly further from expert views than their monthly cost 
estimates. As described below, while the lump sum responses were lower than 
monthly estimates compared to expert benchmarks, the overall structure of lump 
sum responses—and the bimodal distribution identified above—were similar to the 
responses for monthly costs  
Survey responses on lump sum estimates are reported in Table Seven with 
results for all respondents on the top line, followed by responses broken out by age 
cohort and then treatment. The median lump sum estimate for all respondents was 
$50,000, with the twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percentiles of responses ranging 
from $10,000 to $150,000.  
  
                                                                                                                      
“In planning for retirement, some individuals like to think in terms of how much money 
they would need to save by the time they turn 65 in order to have enough money to 
cover out-of-pocket costs in retirement. Imagine that you were asked to give advice to 
someone with similar preferences and health characteristics as your own. If such a 
person wanted to have enough money to cover a reasonable estimate of their total out-
of-pocket costs for health care in retirement, how much do you think they would need to 
have set aside? Please give your answer in terms of the total amount of dollars needed at 
age 65.” 
173 It is possible—as one reader noted—that respondents could interpret this question to mean 
how much they would need to have saved to avoid bankruptcy or significant retirement risk, rather 
than to cover all out-of-pocket costs. In this case, retirees’ estimates would be lower than their 
expectations of total costs, in which case their expectations of total costs would be even closer to 
experts’ estimates than we report herein.  
174 See generally Jeffrey R. Brown et al., Framing and Claiming: How Information-Framing 
Affects Expected Social Security Claiming Behavior (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 17018, 2011) (showing that individuals’ choices on when to claim Social Security benefits, from 
ages sixty-two to seventy, vary based on how this claiming decision is framed); Jeffrey R. Brown, et 
al., Do Consumers Know How to Value Annuities? Complexity as a Barrier to Annuitization (June 7, 
2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (showing difficulty among survey respondents 
in valuing annuities). 
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Table Seven: Lump Sum Estimates 
  N p10 p25 Median  p75 p90 Mean SD 
Suggested Ranges 
from Literature 
Review 
All 
Respondents 1660 $500  $10,000  $50,000  $150,000  $500,000  $1,384,054   49,818,364  
2020 Benchmarks 
for Men: $109,000 at 
the Median; 
$198,000 at the 75th 
percentile; and 
$313,000 at the 90th 
percentile. 
 By Age Cohort 
40-44 201 $1,200  $10,000  $50,000  $150,000  $600,000  $262,927   1,156,264  
45-49 211 $900  $5,000  $35,000  $200,000  $750,000  $659,895   6,283,426  
2020 Benchmarks 
for Women: 
$156,000 at the 
Median; $230,000 at 
the 75th percentile; 
and $357,000 at the 
90th percentile. 
50-54 229 $600  $7,000  $45,000  $150,000  $500,000  $233,590    787,712  
55-59 246 $500  $10,000  $50,000  $150,000  $500,000  $6,907,215   129,215,115  
60-64 253 $300  $5,000  $50,000  $150,000  $400,000  $224,266   1,264,231  
65-69 250 $350  $7,500  $30,000  $150,000  $425,000  $169,440   579,634  2010 Benchmarks 
for Men: $65,000 at 
the Median; 
$118,000 at the 75th 
percentile; and 
$187,000 at the 90th 
percentile. 
70-74 163 $200  $10,000  $50,000  $150,000  $500,000  $1,543,706   13,883,700  
75-80 107 $50  $5,000  $50,000  $150,000  $500,000  $135,410    267,179  
 By Treatment  
2010 Benchmarks 
for Women: $93,000 
at the Median; 
$137,000 at the 75th 
percentile; and 
$213,000 at the 90th 
percentile. 
Treatment A 531 $650  $10,000  $50,000  $200,000  $500,000  $3,489,643  87,689,268 
Treatment B 568 $500  $10,000  $45,000  $150,000  $500,000  $294,073 3,122,465 
Treatment C 561 $500  $7,000  $50,000  $150,000  $500,000  $493,404  6,339,326 
i. Lump Sum Estimates Compared to Benchmarks 
Our comparison of respondent estimates with expert estimates again center on 
2020 benchmarks. As these benchmarks vary by gender, we distinguish between 
projected spending for male and female respondents. Figures Three A-B presents 
histograms of responses for male and female subsamples against their respective 
2020 benchmarks. Our benchmark EBRI study does not include a twenty-fifth 
percentile estimate, so the left hand column of these figures reports the share of 
responses beneath the benchmark median. As with the comparable histograms for 
average monthly costs, Figures Three A-B shows that responses from both men and 
women again produced a bimodal distribution with a healthy share of respondents 
making lump sum estimates above the seventy-fifth percentile of the relevant 
benchmark (28.0% for men and 17.7% for women) and a disproportionate share of 
both subsamples reporting responses beneath the benchmark median (65.2% for men 
and 79.5% for women). While the general structure of these histograms is similar to 
analogous charts for average monthly cost estimates,175 the women’s responses fall 
                                                 
175 The absence of a twenty-fifth percentile benchmark for lump sum estimates makes it harder to 
identify the extent to which our lump sum responses gravitate to the left hand side benchmark 
distributions. However, for our full sample as well as both male and female subsamples, the twenty-
fifth percentile response was $10,000, very far below median lump sum benchmarks for either men 
($109,000) or women ($156,000). Thus, it appears quite likely that our lump sum responses were also 
skewed to lower end estimates.  
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further beneath benchmark metrics than the men’s do. This is particularly true if one 
focuses on median responses. Whereas the men’s median response of $60,000 is 
over 50% of the benchmark median for men of $109,000, the women’s median 
response of $30,000 is less than a fifth of the benchmark median of $156,000 for 
women.176 We discuss this gender differential in more depth in Section 3 below.  
 
 
ii. Lump Sum Estimates by Age Cohorts 
Results broken down by age cohort were also reminiscent of those we obtained 
for estimates of average monthly costs: The median responses of all age cohorts 
were at or close to $50,000, and the distance between the twenty-fifth and seventy-
fifth percentile responses was also highly consistent across age cohorts, although the 
ninetieth percentile responses did tend to drift upward for younger cohorts, again 
suggesting greater uncertainty about future costs. See Figure Three C. On average, 
the younger cohorts seemed to be making lump sum estimates quite similar to those 
of older cohorts on the eve of retirement or in retirement.177  
 
                                                 
176 One sees similar differentials if survey lump sum responses are measured against the 2010 
benchmarks. The 2010 benchmark median for women is $93,000, which is almost three times our 
actual median female estimate of $30,000, whereas the 2010 benchmark median for men is $65,000, 
which is actually quite close to the median male estimate of our respondents: $60,000.  
177 As noted below, respondents did slightly underestimate the likelihood that they would survive 
to ages sixty-five and seventy-five, when compared with expert assessments, which could explain one 
of the reasons why respondents’ lump sum estimates fall a bit further beneath expert estimates than 
was the case with respondents’ average monthly cost estimates.  
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Interpreting responses of younger cohorts on these lump sum questions is 
difficult. Some respondents might have interpreted the question to solicit estimates 
of savings targets for someone reaching sixty-five today in which case adjustment 
for future real increases in healthcare costs would not have been appropriate.178 It is 
also possible that respondents had difficulty in making adjustments to savings 
targets to reflect real increases in future healthcare costs. In this case, it is troubling 
that younger cohorts generally did not project high savings targets, especially if 
these projections influence retirement planning for individuals several decades away 
from retirement.179 While there are undoubtedly complexities in interpreting 
responses of younger cohorts with respect to these savings targets, the fact that 
younger respondents did not estimate materially higher savings needs than older 
cohorts strikes us as a potentially important finding and worthy of further study.180 
iii. Implied Lump Sum Estimates 
 One of the hypotheses that we wanted to explore with our lump sum estimates 
was whether respondents might do a relatively good job estimating monthly costs 
but then make some sort of systematic error in mental math that led them to make 
unreasonably low lump sum estimates. Such a cognitive error would be significant 
because it could lead individuals to set their targeted savings for retirement 
                                                 
178 For the wording of our survey question, see supra note 172. 
179 One hypothesis suggested by a workshop participant is these responses reflect an expectation 
of younger respondents that political forces will not allow out-of-pocket costs to increase above 
$50,000 in current dollars. Under this view, respondents collectively might have a more accurate view 
of future out-of-pocket costs than experts focusing primarily on past trends and without accounting for 
political constraints.  
180 Conclusions with respect to younger cohort responses are probably best drawn from a 
complete review of survey response. We attempt such a summary in the conclusion of this paper.  
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healthcare spending at too low levels, even if they did a relatively good job at 
estimating what their average monthly expenditures for retiree healthcare might be. 
To some degree, such errors may have occurred as the lump sum estimates reported 
above do fall further from expert benchmarks than did respondents’ monthly cost 
estimates.  
To explore whether this reduction in lump sum estimates might be the product 
of errors in respondents’ expectations regarding their own life expectancies, we 
asked all respondents a series of questions about their own assessment of their life 
expectancies.181 In reviewing responses to these questions, we found that 
respondents’ estimates were reasonably close to SSA projections on life expectancy. 
Our median respondents reported an 80% likelihood of living past sixty-five, a 70% 
likelihood of living past seventy-five, a 50% likelihood of living past eighty-five, 
and a 10% likelihood of living past ninety-five. These responses underestimate the 
likelihood of surviving to sixty-five and seventy-five (which Social Security 
actuaries currently put at approximately 92% and 75%) by 10% to 15%, but 
somewhat overestimate the likelihood of living beyond eighty-five (which Social 
Security actuaries estimate in the range of 43%).182 Thus, it does not appear that our 
respondents were systemically underestimating their life expectancies in a material 
way. 
We further analyzed the relationship between respondents’ monthly cost 
estimates and their lump sum estimates by generating for each respondent an 
“implied lump sum estimate,” based on the monthly cost estimates that each 
respondent provided, his or her final year monthly cost estimates, and his or her 
reported self-assessed life expectancy. Using this information, we projected an 
expected cost cash flow for the person and then discounted that cash flow back to a 
valuation at age sixty-five, which represents the amount of money the person would 
need to exactly cover his or her self-reported expected monthly costs. We made 
these calculations using several different discount rates; the results reported here 
employ a 1.5% real discount rate.183 
Rather than excessively discounting their lump sum estimates, respondents 
appear to have modestly adjusted upward their lump sum estimates as compared to 
implied lump sum estimates. The implied lump sum estimates, at least as we 
                                                 
181 Framing of the questions of life expectancy can have an effect on responses, as reported in a 
recent study in John W. Payne et al., Life Expectancy as a Constructed Belief: Evidence of a Live-to 
or Die-by Framing Effect (Columbia Bus. Sch. Research, Paper No. 12-10, 2012). Questions framed 
as the probability of “living to” a particular age generate higher average estimates than those framed 
in terms of “dying by” that same age. Id. at 5. When compared with estimates of life expectancy, 
based on SSA data and adjusted to each respondent’s age and gender, the “living to” frame produced 
subjective estimates closer to the actual estimates than the “dying by” frame at ages sixty-five and 
seventy-five, equally accurate at eighty-five, and less accurate at ninety-five, when both frames lead 
to overly optimistic responses. Id. at 9 fig. 3a.. For purposes of our survey, we adopted a “living to” 
frame to survey respondents’ anticipated life expectancy.  
182 See Actuarial Life Table, supra note 101. Our median responses for surviving past ninety-five 
closely match expert views (9%). Respondents were directionally accurate in reporting longer life 
expectancies for women than for men.  
183 As respondents were instructed to estimate future monthly costs in terms of current dollars, a 
real (as opposed to nominal) discount rate was employed. As a robustness check, we recalculated 
respondents’ implied lump sums using both a 3.0% and a 0% discount rates. With the 3.0 % discount 
rate, median response for cohorts range between $35,000 and $45,000 with an overall median of about 
$10,000 lower than actual lump sum estimates. With a 0% discount rate, the median response for 
cohorts ranged from $45,000 to $75,000 with an overall median about $8000 higher than actual lump 
sum estimates. These results crudely suggest that respondents may be using a mental discount rate 
closer to 1.5%.  
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calculated them, were about 6% lower than respondents’ actual lump sum estimates 
taken as a group ($47,000 median implied lump sum, as compared to $50,000 
median actual estimated lump sum). Conceivably, respondents may have been 
adding a modest cushion of additional savings to make sure they would have enough 
for unanticipated costs. While these results are sensitive to our assumed discount 
rate, the results do not suggest significant downward errors in lump sum calculations 
as compared with monthly costs adjusted for self-reported life expectancies.184 
 
 
 
In fact, we see some evidence of erroneous inflation of lump sum estimates 
when looking at the distribution of implied lump sum estimates by age cohort, as 
shown in Figure Four. The distribution of percentiles is much narrower in this figure 
than in the comparable figure (Figure Three C) for actual lump sum estimates. In 
particular, the ninetieth percentile estimates of the implied lump sum calculations are 
much lower. (In Figure Four, we have superimposed circles indicating the ninetieth 
percentiles for actual lump sum estimates from Figure Three C and boxes to reflect 
the seventy-fifth percentile estimates.) For example, the ninetieth percentile estimate 
of implied lump sums for the forty-five to forty-nine year old age cohort is about 
$180,000 whereas the comparable ninetieth percentile actual lump sum estimate is 
$750,000. In other words, far from excessively discounting their lump sum 
estimates, our respondents in many cases were offering lump sum estimates that 
were substantially higher than the savings levels actually needed to match their own 
estimated monthly costs and self-assessed life expectancies.185 A substantial number 
                                                 
184 Even with a 0% discount rate, the median implied lump sum estimate was just under $58,000. 
185 The upper range of actual lump sum estimates exceed implied lump sum estimates even when 
calculated using a 0% discount rate. So, for example, the ninetieth percentile implied lump sum of the 
forty-five to forty-nine age cohort calculated with a 0% discount rate is roughly $225,000 compared 
with the $750,000 ninetieth percentile estimate for actual lump sum for that age cohort.  
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of respondents appear to have been engaging in mental math that suggested an 
unobtainably high savings target, rather than engaging in mental math that set 
unrealistically low savings needs. Such high targets could create a barrier to saving 
due to a sense of futility, as discussed further below. 
iv. Other Notable Features of Lump Sum Estimates 
As reported in Table Seven above, lump sum estimates showed extremely 
modest variation across treatments, with all three treatments having a median 
estimate of approximately $50,000 and only a modest narrowing of distributions 
from Treatment A to the other two treatments. So, as was true of monthly cost 
estimates, framing and anchoring had negligible effects on responses. 
3. Estimates and Demographic Spending Variation 
One of the complexities in interpreting respondents’ answers is uncertainty 
about whether those reporting low or high estimated costs are, in fact, individuals 
who will actually incur below or above median healthcare costs in retirement. To 
tease out this question, we segmented our sample into a series of subgroups based on 
income, gender, self-reported health status, and financial sophistication (based on 
self-reported information on financial planning and familiarity with budgeting and 
healthcare insurance, as well as self-reported consultations with financial planners). 
We then analyzed whether this partitioning of the data produced differences in 
average monthly cost estimates or actual lump sum estimates that were consistent 
with expert evaluations of the relationships between these categories and out-of-
pocket retiree healthcare costs. The results, which are summarized in Table Eight for 
average monthly costs, are mixed. 186 
  
                                                 
186 We focus here on findings that the regression analysis, discussed below, suggests are 
significant. Monthly estimates increased with higher levels of self-reported health status of 
respondents, as reported in Table Eight, but the regression analysis below suggests this effect may 
simply reflect interactions with income or education level. 
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Table Eight: Average Monthly Cost Estimates by Gender, Health Status, 
Income Quintiles and Financial Sophistication 
  N p10 p25 Median  p75 p90 Mean SD 
 By Income Quintile                
Quintile 1 345 $0 $30 $100 $200 $392 $455 5267 
Quintile 2 432 $35 $83 $200 $350 $600 $503 6240 
Quintile 3 263 $43 $100 $250 $450 $700 $341 371 
Quintile 4 447 $50 $125 $283 $500 $750 $392 540 
Quintile 5 187 $100 $200 $350 $633 $1,005 $525 542 
 By Gender                 
Male 729 $25 $90 $217 $467 $758 $436 1268 
Female 948 $30 $80 $190 $361 $600 $445 5431 
 By Health Status (self reported)              
Excellent 151 $40 $100 $300 $500 $1,000 $451 664 
Very Good 646 $40 $100 $220 $400 $667 $619 6536 
Good 601 $33 $90 $200 $400 $658 $324 485 
Fair 222 $10 $45 $150 $361 $650 $291 431 
Poor 56 $0 $33 $150 $417 $767 $353 618 
 By Self-Assessed Familiarity with Government Programs and Insurance Plans   
Low Familiarity 545 $23 $83 $200 $417 $667 $572 6584 
Medium 507 $45 $100 $200 $413 $700 $427 1455 
High Familiarity  625 $20 $75 $200 $392 $700 $308 427 
 By Self-Assessed Attention to Monthly Healthcare Costs and Other Expenses   
Low Familiarity 511 $20 $50 $167 $375 $650 $474 5538 
Medium 412 $40 $100 $217 $400 $667 $417 1605 
High Familiarity  754 $35 $100 $210 $433 $700 $430 3628 
 By Self-Reported Consultations with Financial Planner About Retirement     
Yes 578 $50 $140 $300 $517 $800 $474 5538 
No 1074 $20 $67 $175 $350 $600 $417 1605 
Don’t Know  25 $50 $150 $233 $300 $500 $430 3628 
 
Variations by income levels tracked expert evaluations. As discussed above, 
higher income individuals tend to pay more for retiree healthcare and also live 
longer, thereby increasing overall retiree healthcare costs. Our survey respondents 
seemed to be quite attuned to this effect. So, as reported in Table Eight, the median 
expected monthly cost of the lowest quintile respondents was just $100, whereas the 
median response for the highest quintile of respondents was $350. As shown in 
Figure Five, this differential was even more pronounced with respect to lump sum 
estimates where median estimates of the lowest income quintile were $10,000, as 
compared to $125,000 for the highest quintile. In terms of the effect of income on 
retiree healthcare costs, respondents’ intuitions were directionally aligned with 
expert views, even if perhaps showing a stronger effect than experts might suggest is 
likely.187 
 
                                                 
187 Wealthier respondents also gave higher estimates of total Medicare premiums. See supra 
notes 95-99. 
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We observed the opposite with regard to gender. As a result of having longer 
life expectancies and more expensive supplemental coverage, a typical woman 
retiring in 2010 has 40% higher expected out-of-pocket healthcare costs in 
retirement than a typical man188 and higher expected annual costs.189 Nevertheless, 
as reported in the second section of Table Eight, women largely estimated lower 
average monthly costs than men with a median estimate of $190 for women as 
compared to $217 for men. This difference was even more pronounced for lump sum 
estimates, where women’s median estimate was $30,000 versus $60,000 for men. 
Thus, women underestimated average monthly healthcare costs as compared to men 
and compounded that underestimation in producing lump sum estimates, making 
their actual reported median estimates substantially below the benchmark median 
estimates for women, as drawn from our literature review. 
Finally, we explored whether self-reported financial sophistication might be 
correlated with survey responses. We asked all respondents three questions to gauge 
financial sophistication. The most pronounced effect on monthly estimates came 
from our third question on financial sophistication: whether respondents had 
consulted with a financial planner about retirement.190 The median estimate among 
respondents who reported a consultation with a financial planner was $300, as 
compared to $175 for respondents who said they had not. While one must treat self-
reported responses of this sort with caution, these results do raise the possibility that 
                                                 
188 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
189 See supra note 103. 
190 Responses to questions regarding familiarity with government programs and the level of 
attention they pay to monthly healthcare costs and other expenses showed little or no effect on 
estimates. Although familiarity does not appear to be strongly associated with differences in 
respondent estimates, older respondents reported a much higher degree of familiarity on these 
dimensions than did younger respondents. 
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personal interventions with respect to retiree healthcare costs may be effective in 
raising individual estimates of retiree healthcare costs.  
In an effort to explore the interactions between these various correlates and 
respondents’ estimates, we conducted a series of regression analyses. Table Nine A 
reports summary results for four rudimentary models examining the correlates of 
monthly cost responses. The first three columns of Table Nine A are quantile 
regressions (at the twenty-fifth percentile, median, and seventy-fifth percentile) and 
the fourth column is a trimmed Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) log formulation.191 
For each regression, we included gender, a dummy for age cohorts younger than 
fifty-five, income quintiles, health status, educational achievement, and a dummy 
representing consultations with financial planners as independent variables. While 
explaining only a small fraction of overall variation in monthly costs, all four models 
show consistent, statistically significant coefficients for the dummy for younger 
cohorts, income quintiles, educational attainment, and the financial planner dummy, 
suggesting that all of these variables are correlated with estimates of monthly costs. 
The coefficients for these variables also were intuitively coherent, with higher 
income quartiles having larger coefficients than lower income quartiles, and the 
magnitude of the coefficients for the financial planner dummy and educational 
attainment increasing for higher percentile regressions. The models also suggest that, 
once other factors are controlled for, respondents from younger cohorts do offer 
somewhat higher estimates of monthly costs than do the older cohorts, although the 
magnitude of those differences (on the range of $17 to $82 in the quantile 
regressions) do not equal the projected increases in future health costs that experts 
predict.192 While the female dummy has a negative coefficient in two of the models, 
in only one model is the coefficient statistically significant, casting some doubt on 
earlier results suggesting that women were making lower estimates across the board 
for monthly costs than men (once controls for educational attainment and household 
income are included).  
  
                                                 
191 We utilized these functional forms to limit the influence of outliers on the analysis. As noted 
earlier, some respondent estimates—especially with respect to lump sum estimates—seemed 
unreasonably high, suggesting that perhaps some responses may have been protest bids in response to 
inherently difficult questions or for some other reason providing implausible answers. In prior 
sections of our analysis we have relied on median and percentile analysis to limit the impact of these 
outliers. As compared to traditional OLS regression, quantile regressions serve a similar function. The 
log form of the fourth model also reduces the influence of outliers as does our trimming of the top 1% 
of observations, which eliminates survey responses with average monthly costs over roughly $2500.  
192 When we segmented the sample into male and female subsamples and re-ran our regressions, 
the coefficient for the younger cohort variables remained statistically significant for only the male 
subsample, suggesting that men were driving the higher cost estimates from younger cohorts reported 
in the text. 
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Table Nine A: Examining the Correlates of Average Monthly Cost 
Estimates with Quantile Regressions and Trimmed and Log OLS 
 (1) 25th Percentile 
(2) 
Median 
(3) 
75th Percentile 
(4) 
Log OLS 
Trimmed 
Female 3.556 (7.876) 
-13.077 
(13.271) 
-61.248*** 
(21.524) 
-0.016 
(0.079) 
Younger Three 
Age Cohorts 
17.685** 
(8.083) 
36.154*** 
(13.621) 
82.438*** 
(22.091) 
0.172** 
(0.082) 
Second Income 
Quintile 
44.333*** 
(12.780) 
74.359*** 
(21.535) 
148.657*** 
(34.926) 
0.879*** 
(0.139) 
Third Income 
Quintile 
53.333*** 
(12.139) 
89.744*** 
(20.455) 
169.752*** 
(33.175) 
1.053*** 
(0.156) 
Fourth Income 
Quintile 
80.796*** 
(13.583) 
115.641*** 
(22.889) 
208.905*** 
(37.122) 
1.081*** 
(0.157) 
Fifth Income 
Quintile 
104.370*** 
(13.420) 
177.949*** 
(22.613) 
253.286*** 
(36.675) 
1.410*** 
(0.156) 
Health Status 4.056 (4.395) 
12.821* 
(7.406) 
12.886 
(12.012) 
-0.034 
(0.056) 
Educational 
Attainment 
6.519*** 
(1.967) 
8.205** 
(3.315) 
12.686** 
(5.376) 
0.027 
(0.022) 
Consultation with 
Financial Planner 
31.611*** 
(8.788) 
64.359*** 
(14.807) 
116.914*** 
(24.015) 
0.276*** 
(0.078) 
Constant -57.796
** 
(28.104) 
-23.333 
(47.357) 
29.962 
(76.805) 
3.821*** 
(0.303) 
Observations 1673 1673 1673 1654 
Adjusted 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.026 0.031 0.032 0.143 
F    18.447 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Models One to Three utilize Quantile Regressions to estimate the coefficients; Model Four utilizes OLS. 
Quantile Regressions utilize unweighted data. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table Nine B presents similar regressions for lump sum estimates.193 While 
most of the results were similar to those for average monthly cost estimates, the 
female dummy did, however, behave differently in the lump sum regressions, with 
consistently negative coefficients in all four regressions and statistically significant 
coefficients for three quantile regressions. So, negative effects of gender on cost 
estimates identified early seem to reemerge with these lump sum regressions, 
suggesting that women’s estimates are more likely to fall short of men’s when 
dealing with lifetime costs as opposed to monthly budgets. The financial planner 
dummy was again consistently significant in all models. The coefficients for income 
quintiles and younger cohorts were not as consistently statistically significant as 
                                                 
193 Trimming of the top 1% of lump sum estimates eliminated responses with estimates in excess 
of $3.0 million on the fourth model. 
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with the monthly cost regressions, but they still retained the same basic structure as 
the analogous coefficients in the monthly cost regressions.  
 
Table Nine B: Examining the Correlates of Lump Sum Estimates with Quantile 
Regressions and Trimmed Log OLS 
 (1) 
25th Percentile 
(2) 
Median 
(3) 
75th Percentile 
(4) 
Log OLS 
Trimmed 
Female -10007.407
*** 
(2602.090) 
-14545.455* 
(7534.554) 
-49946.667*** 
(16920.906) 
-0.094 
(0.177) 
Younger Three 
Age Cohorts 
3709.259 
(2673.710) 
7272.727 
(7741.934) 
57005.714*** 
(17386.635) 
0.199 
(0.172) 
Second Income 
Quintile 
157.407 
(4231.914) 
8181.818 
(12253.835) 
64171.429** 
(27519.343) 
0.903*** 
(0.280) 
Third Income 
Quintile 
7261.111* 
(4012.512) 
34090.909*** 
(11618.539) 
78556.190*** 
(26092.613) 
1.443*** 
(0.358) 
Fourth Income 
Quintile 
5000.000 
(4494.106) 
32727.273** 
(13013.032) 
149893.333*** 
(29224.329) 
1.612*** 
(0.285) 
Fifth Income 
Quintile 
28231.481*** 
(4425.940) 
66363.636*** 
(12815.652) 
214144.762*** 
(28781.058) 
1.682*** 
(0.366) 
Health Status -2261.111 (1452.695) 
3636.364 
(4206.390) 
14251.429 
(9446.601) 
-0.055 
(0.111) 
Educational 
Attainment 
-485.185 
(651.335) 
4090.909** 
(1885.991) 
7139.048* 
(4235.510) 
0.183*** 
(0.043) 
Consultation with 
Financial Planner 
11842.593*** 
(2900.927) 
35454.545*** 
(8399.860) 
57192.381*** 
(18864.187) 
0.529*** 
(0.177) 
Constant 18896.296
** 
(9302.138) 
-26818.182 
(26935.062) 
-49786.667 
(60490.062) 
7.004*** 
(0.612) 
Observations 1656 1656 1656 1637 
Adjusted 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.123 
F    16.914 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Models One to Three utilize Quantile Regressions to estimate the coefficients; Model Four utilizes OLS. 
Quantile Regressions utilize unweighted data. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
The regression models presented in the preceding tables should be viewed with 
some caution. To begin, survey responses on cost estimates are difficult to model as 
they skew towards higher numbers with a fairly large number of outliers. While 
quantile regressions, trimming, and log transformations of dependent variables are 
all designed to mitigate those complexities, these adjustments may not offer 
complete solutions. In addition, the explanatory power of the models is limited, with 
quite low adjusted R-Squares and Pseudo R-Squares in all cases. That said, the 
correlations with income, use of financial planners, and educational achievement 
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seem reasonably robust.194 Our survey responses, taken as a whole, did reflect the 
reality that wealthier respondents will likely spend more on healthcare costs in 
retirement as a result of a combination of progressive insurance premiums, higher 
consumption of healthcare services by the more affluent, and greater longevity. The 
strong performance of the financial planner dummy suggests that this kind of 
financial education may be associated with higher estimates of retiree healthcare 
costs, although causation here is unclear. While the negative correlation between the 
female dummy and cost estimates was not robust across all our regressions, the 
negative coefficients on female lump sum estimates were often statistically 
significant, and we certainly did not find any evidence that women were estimating 
higher healthcare costs than men, as experts suggest they should. On balance, our 
results suggest the possibility that women may well fail to appreciate that they face 
higher healthcare costs in retirement and, indeed, may be systemically 
underestimating costs as compared to men, at least with respect to their lump sum 
estimates. 
  
C. ESTIMATING UNCERTAINTY: HEALTH, MEDICAL INFLATION, POLICY CHANGE 
In the final module of our survey, we divided all respondents into two separate 
groups and asked each group a series of questions designed to elicit their assessment 
of three sources of potential risk for out-of-pocket healthcare expenses in retirement: 
variation in individual health experience, unanticipated medical cost growth, and 
changes in government policies with respect to Medicare and other government 
programs. As discussed earlier in our literature review, all three of the risks could be 
material. Variations in individual health experience could double to triple individual 
out-of-pocket costs above median levels, and government policy changes could as 
much as double them. Respondents across the board did not identify individual 
health and policy changes as the most salient risks, nor did they appreciate the extent 
to which these risks could increase their out-of-pocket spending for healthcare in 
retirement. Thus, we found that while respondents’ understanding of typical out-of-
pocket spending is variable, their understanding of uncertainty is pervasively low. 
1. Group One: Assessments of Concern and Severity  
For half of our respondents, we asked them to make a qualitative assessment of 
the risk that each form of uncertainty poses to future spending. First, we asked 
respondents in this group to evaluate on a four-point scale how concerned they were 
about each of the risks. Second, we asked them if the risk should materialize, how 
much more they would need to budget for out-of-pocket healthcare costs if they 
wanted to be “highly confident” of having sufficient resources to cover the costs. 
In this formulation, respondents seemed to identify policy changes and medical 
inflation as being the greater sources of risk, but they underestimated the potential 
magnitude of both. In terms of level of concern, summarized in Figure Six, these two 
risks dominated across age cohorts. Again, this response is inconsistent with expert 
perceptions of the relative risk, which would clearly rank variations in individual 
                                                 
194 In other regression runs not reported here, we found the relationship between respondents’ 
estimates and expectations regarding health insurance coverage were generally consistent with expert 
estimates of the relationship between supplemental coverage and total out-of-pocket costs. For 
example, respondents reporting higher expectations of having Medicaid coverage made lower 
estimates of out of pocket costs, while those expecting Medigap coverage estimated higher spending.  
RETIREE OUT-OF-POCKET HEALTHCARE SPENDING 51 
 
 
health experience, and probably also policy uncertainty, as a more significant risk 
than unanticipated medical inflation, especially for those at or near retirement for 
whom any inflation will have limited impact. 
 
 
 
On the issue of how large of a financial impact respondents estimated that the 
risks could pose to their budgets, nearly all respondents underestimate the magnitude 
of these risks, especially with regard to individual health experience risk. Figure 
Seven reports responses for Individual Health Experience (on the left) and Policy 
Changes (on the right). For example, only a fifth of all respondents estimated that 
adverse individual health experience could lead to a more than 50% increase in out-
of-pocket costs, although expert opinion suggests those who end up in the seventy-
fifth or ninetieth percentile of out-of-pocket costs are likely to spend double to triple 
that of someone at the median.195 Similarly, less than a third of respondents reported 
that they would need at least 50% more in financial resources to compensate for 
adverse changes in government policy, even though expert views are that some 
current reform proposals for Medicare could have a much larger effect.196  
 
                                                 
195 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
196 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. It is possible that our respondents chose a middle 
option out of the five multiple choice responses. Nonetheless, such random selection would suggest 
ignorance. Furthermore, answers with regard to individual health experience were skewed more 
toward the second choice and policy uncertainty toward the third, which confirms less concern with 
individual health experience than with policy uncertainty.  
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2. Group Two: Willingness to Pay 
To gain an alternative perspective on the topic of risk, we posed questions to the 
other half in terms of their willingness to pay to be free of each of these specific 
risks.197 As reported in Table Ten, the median respondent was willing to pay a 
monthly insurance premium of about $150 to be relieved from the risk of higher out-
of-pocket costs from individual health experience. While it is difficult to know if 
this specific estimate is actuarially sound, what is most interesting is that the 
willingness to pay responses for each of these three questions were roughly similar. 
While the medians for responses on willingness to pay for protection against medical 
inflation and willingness to pay for protection against policy changes were a bit 
lower ($125 and $120, respectively) than the health experience analog ($150), the 
distributions were roughly comparable. Certainly, there is no indication in this data 
that respondents overall were especially concerned about individual health 
experience or policy changes; indeed the latter had the lowest median and 
distribution ranges of the three.198 Nor was there strong evidence in our results that 
younger workers were particularly wary about risking healthcare costs. Responses to 
the other two willingness to pay questions suggest that younger respondents placed a 
                                                 
197 An illustrative question here read as follows: “Research suggests that health care expenses in 
retirement can vary considerably from individual to individual based on differences in the health of 
individuals and their medical needs. As a result, out-of-pocket costs for some individuals can be much 
higher than those of the average retiree. How much would you be willing to pay each month for an 
insurance policy that fully protected you from incurring out-of-pocket costs higher than those of the 
average retiree, regardless of your own health or medical needs?”  
198 The cohort on the eve of retirement, ages sixty to sixty-four, did, however, skew somewhat 
higher at the top end of the distribution in their willingness to pay for insurance against policy 
changes and against high individual healthcare costs. 
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higher value on protection against bad individual health experience and policy 
changes than did older respondents, but even there the trends were not especially 
strong. Thus, our primary takeaway from this inquiry into risk assessment is that 
respondents did not sharply distinguish across type of risks nor were younger 
workers markedly more concerned about unanticipated inflation or even policy 
changes than older respondents.  
 
Table Ten: Willingness to Pay for Protection Against Three Risks 
 N p10 p25 Median p75 p90 Mean SD 
Protection Against High 
Costs from Individual 
Health Experience 
834 $30 $75 $150 $300 $600 $574 4510.7 
Protection Against 
High Costs Unanticipated 
Inflation in Medical 
Costs 
833 $20 $50 $125 $250 $500 $341 1364.6 
Protection Against High 
Costs form Adverse 
Policy Changes 
833 $10 $50 $120 $250 $500 $442 3434.2 
 
To be sure, there are considerable complexities in interpreting individual 
assessments of financial risks, but the responses to this module of our survey suggest 
to us that our respondents had difficulty distinguishing among sources of risk and 
may in some areas substantially underestimate the extent of the potential risk, in 
particular with regard to their own individual health experiences. 
IV. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This article offers a starting point for investigation of the timely and important 
issue of Americans’ expectations about their likely out-of-pocket healthcare 
expenditures in retirement. The evolving structure of healthcare benefits and 
regulation aims to promote greater individual autonomy and decision-making and 
rests on the assumption that individuals can make good decisions. Our analysis 
suggests places where lack of knowledge could impede sound decision-making. In 
Part A of this final section, we discuss key takeaways from our research. In Part B, 
we consider ways to increase financial security for retirees through improved 
financial planning and greater insurance protection.  
A. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Point One: Quality of Overall Estimates and Demographic Variation 
a. Overall Estimates  
One unexpected insight from this study was identifying instances in which many 
respondents’ answers were similar to expert estimates. Many respondents’ estimates 
of likely out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures in retirement accord with expert 
estimates of likely spending. A substantial fraction of respondents offered estimates 
of out-of-pocket expenditures in retirement that were at or above median expert 
estimates. This was true for both estimates of average monthly expenses and for 
lump sum estimates. In many instances, a quarter of respondents made cost estimates 
that were above the seventy-fifth percentile of expert projections. So, a substantial 
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share of respondents’ estimates mapped onto the upper end of experts’ predicted 
distribution of retiree healthcare costs. As emphasized above, we cannot be 
confident that the respondents who estimated higher retiree health costs are the 
individuals who will actually incur those costs. Still, the number of respondents 
giving relatively high out-of-pocket healthcare cost estimates was greater than we 
had anticipated, and even the median estimate for monthly costs was closer than we 
had expected to the median expert estimate. Overall, respondents offered sensible 
answers with regard to life expectancies and projections of increasing healthcare 
costs in the last year of life. Respondents’ estimates about likely insurance coverage 
in retirement were not far from actual coverage levels, even if somewhat overly 
optimistic with regard to likelihood of future Medicaid or ESI coverage. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, there are aspects of our findings that raise 
concerns. While nearly 40% of the population estimated above expert median 
estimates for monthly spending, over half of our respondents’ estimates were below 
the twenty-fifth percentile expert benchmarks. By definition, if the expert estimates 
are accurate, at least half of those estimating costs below the twenty-fifth percentile 
are underestimating future costs. With regard to lump-sum targets, median responses 
were a half to a fifth of expert median estimates for men and women, respectively, 
suggesting that a very large fraction of our respondents were seriously 
underestimating the amount of savings they would need to accumulate in order to 
cover healthcare costs in retirement, and a disproportionate number of men (65%) 
and women (79%) offered estimates below the median expert benchmark.199 
On the other end of the distribution, respondents with the highest lump sum 
estimates might—if these outlier estimates are genuine—be engaged in 
overestimation that discourages actual savings. What is striking is the unexpected 
overestimation—often by substantial amounts—of reported lump sums, as compared 
to implied lump sums based on life expectancies and monthly projections. Some 
individuals may be radically overestimating their savings needs for retiree heath in a 
way that could discourage actual savings out of a sense of futility. This finding 
warrants additional work and suggests that there may be potential to show people 
that achieving sufficient savings might be more feasible than they imagine.  
The degree to which younger cohorts’ expectations are especially deficient in 
comparison to older cohorts is less clear but suggests an important area for further 
investigation. On some survey responses, younger cohorts did seem to expect higher 
costs, as in the case of future Medicare premiums, as experts project. However, in 
assessing average monthly costs of retiree healthcare and lump sum estimates of 
required savings, younger cohorts reported only slightly greater estimates than older 
cohorts. While interpretation of these responses is ambiguous, our results raise the 
possibility that younger cohorts are materially underestimating their out-of-pocket 
costs for healthcare in retirement. They might be particularly good targets for efforts 
to improve financial planning while at a point in the lifecycle—during their working 
                                                 
199 As discussed above, a number of reasons could explain why respondents fell somewhat further beneath 
expert benchmarks for their lump sum estimates than they did for monthly cost estimates. In part, the 
difference could be a result of respondents somewhat underestimating their likelihood of surviving to age 
seventy-five. In addition, respondents may have had difficulty in calculating what is essentially the NPV of 
expected healthcare costs, although, as noted above, our implied lump sum analysis suggests that at least 
some respondents erred in overestimating the NPV equivalent of their projected monthly costs discounted by 
self-reported life expectancies. In addition, some respondents may have misinterpreted our question about 
lump sum estimates.  Finally, our benchmark studies are based on somewhat different assumptions and do 
not perfectly align with each other.   
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years—where it may still be possible for some individuals to plan successfully for 
future expenditures.  
b. Demographic Variation  
As discussed above, respondents’ estimates varied appropriately and 
significantly according to only some of the factors that experts report are predictive 
of future spending. Regression analysis showed our respondents’ estimates were 
directionally correct in some regards. For example, our higher income respondents 
estimated relatively higher out-of-pocket spending, consistent with expert studies of 
spending. In addition, respondents’ expected levels of insurance coverage 
corresponded with variations in their estimates of out-of-pocket costs consistent with 
what experts report.200  
The places where respondents seem least sensitive to the fact that demographic 
factors might cause them to have higher baseline spending suggest targeted 
opportunities for intervention. The women in our survey showed a dramatically less 
acute understanding of future out-of-pocket expenditures than the men in our survey 
with regard to lifetime spending estimates. Even similar estimates given by men and 
women would be reason for concern in light of the evidence that women spend 
significantly more than men on out-of-pocket healthcare over the course of 
retirement. Yet women offered lower absolute lifetime spending estimates than men, 
suggesting both less knowledge of spending and possible insensitivity to the fact that 
women spend more than their male counterparts.  
Assuming our data is correct, it is difficult to know why this gender gap exists. 
Our women respondents may underestimate for the same reasons that women, even 
college-educated women, lag behind men on measures of financial literacy and 
numeracy, as evinced repeatedly in studies.201 It is possible that many of these 
women have relied on another individual for household financial management. 
Regardless of the explanation, women are particularly financially vulnerable in 
retirement if they fail to anticipate this source of significant future costs.  
This finding confirms the need to close the gender gap that leaves women 
behind in matters of mathematics and finances, a problem with roots much deeper 
than we can examine here. One more modest option is to focus efforts to improve 
financial planning on women, in particular, as examined in Part B.1 below. More 
ambitiously, we might reconsider the wisdom of an insurance system that leaves 
many women with little income in retirement but, even at the median, subject to 
50% more spending than the typical man, even before factoring in long-term care 
costs.  
                                                 
200 See supra note 194. 
201 Annamaria Lusardi, Financial Literacy: An Essential Tool for Informed Consumer Choice? 2 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14084, 2008) (explaining that financial 
“[i]lliteracy is widespread among the general population and particularly acute among specific 
demographic groups, such as women”); Dan Kadlec, Women and Money: Even College Grads Flunk 
Personal Finance, TIME (June 28, 2012), available at http://moneyland.time.com/2012/06/28/women-
and-money-even-college-grads-flunk-personal-finance/ (describing a new study that reports low 
financial literacy scores for women); Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia Mitchell, Financial Literacy and 
Retirement Planning: New Evidence from the Rand American Life Panel 10 (Mich. Retirement 
Research Ctr., Paper No. WP 2007-157, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1095869; see also Annamaria Lusardi et al., Financial Sophistication in 
Older Population 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17863, 2012). 
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c. Further Research  
Our research suggests several important directions for further study. As a 
preliminary matter, based on what we learned in our literature review, we note the 
need for better collection of data on out-of-pocket healthcare costs and greater 
consistency in how these costs are defined and measured as a foundation for any of 
the approaches discussed. As healthcare costs continue to increase and politicians 
debate reform proposals, policymakers need to have better data on the current 
distribution of out-of-pocket cost for retirees and the implications of competing 
reform proposals on these costs. The lack of consistent, quality data makes it 
difficult to address a healthcare spending problem when there is disagreement on the 
definition and magnitude of the problem among the experts in this field.  
While policy implications of this work, discussed below, focus on respondents 
who underestimate the magnitude of retiree healthcare costs and the risks associated 
with those costs, further study into the respondents with estimates of retiree 
healthcare costs above experts’ median projections would also be valuable. While 
our survey design did not offer insight into how these respondents came up with 
their estimates, there are a number of reasons why a substantial portion of the 
population might have a “ballpark sense” of retiree out-of-pocket healthcare costs. 
At least in the case of monthly cost estimates, our respondents may merely offer a 
small, non-zero guess of a couple of hundred dollars in response to a question that 
implied the existence of some costs. Alternatively, as healthcare costs and premiums 
are pervasive throughout life, respondents could possibly be inferring retirement 
costs from their own prior and current experience. Or they might also have 
familiarity with parents’ or acquaintances’ experiences with Medicare and other 
forms of supplemental retiree coverage. Or, consistent with our finding that 
consultations with financial planners are positively correlated with cost estimates, 
some respondents may have benefitted from financial education. Understanding the 
thought processes of individuals who came up with cost estimates within the range 
of expert predictions would inform how to reproduce similar results with others.  
Another important question to explore is the extent to which higher estimates of 
retiree healthcare costs are associated with higher levels of dedicated savings for 
these costs or other forms of financial planning that make these individuals better 
prepared to finance these expenditures in retirement. In other words, does specific 
knowledge of retiree healthcare costs make individuals better prepared to bear those 
costs? Similarly, it would be valuable to ascertain whether severe overestimation of 
retiree health costs dampens retirement savings on the grounds, suggested above, 
that overly high estimates provoke savings futility. In short, further study of the 
relationship between estimates of retiree healthcare costs and actual financial 
planning behavior would provide a crucial link for future reforms. 
2. Point Two: Uncertainty and Risk 
Our findings, while tentative here, suggest that people struggle to gauge the 
variability in spending they might face due to three key drivers of future spending 
uncertainty: (1) variation in individual health experience among retirees; (2) 
unanticipated medical cost growth; and (3) changes in government policies with 
respect to Medicare and other government programs that could increase out-of-
pocket costs for some or all retirees. In other words, respondents did not understand 
the potential that they might face debilitating and unpredictable future spending.  
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Most—but not all—of our respondents identified all of these sources of 
uncertainty as causing concern, but they failed to effectively distinguish between the 
magnitude of each. In particular, it seems that our respondents underestimated the 
risk posed by relatively high individual health expenditures. While this risk is 
arguably the greatest of the three risks for anyone now nearing or in retirement, our 
respondents did not unambiguously identify it as greater than the others and 
underestimated the magnitude of variability in spending they might face if they were 
in the upper end of the spending distribution. They arguably also underestimated the 
magnitude of potential spending variability due to policy change, especially at a 
moment in time when Medicare is vulnerable to fundamental changes.  
Failure to appropriately account for spending uncertainty would mean that even 
those retirees with responses similar to experts’ median estimates might be 
unprepared to finance future costs if any of the above risks came to fruition. 
Furthermore, when making insurance selections and purchases, they might not 
accurately consider the risks against which they need to protect. For example, a 
retiree aware of and in a position to finance median out-of-pocket spending for 
someone like herself could nonetheless face financial crisis if she experiences a 
serious health problem or develops a chronic condition that propels her into the 
ninetieth percentile of spenders, leading to costs double what she planned to finance. 
Failure to comprehend the potential implications of policy reforms, such as major 
changes in Medicare and Medicaid programs, could also inhibit informed 
engagement in political debates on entitlement reform.  
The difficulty that consumers face in comprehending and managing risk is a 
recurring theme in academic studies on cognitive processing and retirement 
planning, with work on the annuity puzzle being perhaps the most familiar 
example.202 In light of this work, our findings on the inability of respondents to 
understand the potential levels of variability of future spending are hardly surprising. 
Retiree healthcare costs are, in essence, a negative annuity that depends on a host of 
imponderables including life expectancies, individual healthcare experience, policy 
changes, and changes in healthcare costs. It is surprising enough that many 
respondents were able to make plausible ballpark estimates of typical costs; it would 
have strained credulity had they also apprehended risks and uncertainty correctly. 
Still, these cognitive limitations have important implications for insurance design, 
regulation, and policy, as discussed below.  
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Our findings suggest two distinct problems that could hamper retirees’ ability to 
finance out-of-pocket healthcare spending. Point One above addresses ways in 
which retirees fail to anticipate likely future expenditures, even for a typical retiree. 
The design of our current system for financing retiree healthcare costs implicitly 
assumes that most retirees will plan to finance these costs. Places where we observe 
underestimation suggest opportunities to improve knowledge of and/or financial 
planning for retiree healthcare expenditures, as discussed in the first section below. 
                                                 
202 For an overview of cognitive biases with respect to risk and uncertainty, see Christine Jolls & 
Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 203-25 (2006). See also Howell E. 
Jackson, Accounting for Social Security Benefits, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 261, 271-75 
(Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006). For an overview of the annuitization puzzle with a 
helpful review of the literature, see Jeffrey Brown, Understanding the Role of Annuities in Retirement 
Planning, in OVERCOMING THE SAVINGS SLUMP: HOW TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
FINANCIAL EDUCATION AND SAVINGS PROGRAMS 178-206 (Annamaria Lusardi ed., 2008). 
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Point Two discusses our finding of a widespread misapprehension of level of 
spending variability—a problem that may be best addressed with an insurance 
response, as discussed in the last section below.  
1. Improving Financial Planning: Opportunities and Challenges 
While our findings suggest that the overall financial literacy gap with regard to 
out-of-pocket costs may be smaller than we anticipated for at least some portion of 
the population, our results suggest some areas in which well-targeted efforts might 
help people better understand and plan for healthcare spending in retirement.  
For example, targeting efforts at women may be productive in light of the fact 
that women live longer than men and will need to manage out-of-pocket spending 
for more years and, for those who outlive a spouse or partner, on their own. 
Likewise, efforts focused on younger working-age individuals might also be 
valuable during a time when they are in the best a position to save more. Especially 
if interest rates remain low and healthcare costs continue to outpace GDP growth, 
they may need to save considerably more than anticipated.  
Our findings do not point toward any one particular approach to improve 
planning. A healthy debate exists in the literature over whether education or 
approaches that more directly shape behavior, based on defaults or incentives, are 
more welfare-promoting. One way to address a knowledge deficiency would be 
through financial education to bring individual expectations more in line with expert 
estimations. Especially to the degree people might be focused on accumulating 
sufficient savings for future healthcare needs,203 priming them to consider the 
magnitude of this particular category of future costs could be an effective way to 
motivate more saving.204 Supporters of financial education approaches argue that 
such an approach allows people to make decisions based on individual preferences, 
rather than presuming one-size-fits-all solutions (as savings defaults might do).205 
For educational efforts to be effective, consumers must be capable of understanding 
the information provided and able and willing to respond to it.206 
Results of financial education programs undertaken by employers and the 
government have been mixed,207 and there is healthy skepticism among some 
scholars of their value.208 More information alone, for example, might not lead to 
greater understanding. The anchoring in our treatments, designed to simulate 
financial education, had surprisingly little effect on total monthly costs or lump sum 
                                                 
203 De Nardi et al., supra note 11, at 72-73 (describing the strong effect of future healthcare 
spending needs on savings).  
204 Of course, individuals do not need to be primed to save an amount sufficient to cover total 
retiree healthcare costs. See generally Barbara A. Butrica et al., The Changing Impact of Social 
Security on Retirements Income in the United States, SOC. SEC. BULLETIN, no. 3, 2003/2004, available 
at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v65n3/v65n3p1.pdf. As a result of social security, most 
American have some amount of annuity income in retirement and a portion of that income could be 
used to support monthly costs. Id. Thus, sensible financial planning for retiree healthcare costs might 
consist of a combination of precautionary savings and budgeted monthly costs. 
205 Amir & Lobel, supra note at 19, at 20 (“P]erhaps more than with some policy fields . . . health 
policy cannot be simply about directing healthy behavior but must aim for an understanding of how 
individuals reason and decide.”). 
206 See Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of Transparency in 
Insurance Consumer Protection 9, 18-19 (Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-35, 
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2130908. 
207 Lusardi, supra note 15, at 20-23 (describing the mostly ineffective results of financial 
education programs).  
208 See Schwarcz, supra note 208, at 18-19. 
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estimates, which suggests that education would have to consist of more than simple 
reporting of typical costs. Furthermore, if the healthcare financial literacy gap we are 
observing is part of a larger innumeracy problem, especially for women, efforts to 
improve planning will require improving numeracy so that women have both the 
information and the tools to make good decisions.  
To the extent it might be difficult or inefficient to improve financial security 
through education or among boundedly-rational consumers, more deliberate 
interventions might be more effective. For example, the use of choice architecture 
approaches could prompt increased savings. Such approaches have been shown to 
bolster overall retirement savings.209 Alternatively, recent financial literacy work has 
suggested the effectiveness of an intermediate approach, using planning aids that 
guide people through financial decisions at critical decision moments, instead of 
using either generalized education seminars or strong defaults.210 Further research 
would have to investigate which of these types of efforts could in fact increase 
savings for healthcare out-of-pocket spending without cannibalizing other retirement 
savings or necessary current consumption.  
These approaches presume that at least some portion of the population that 
underestimates future spending needs could better plan for these costs if desired. A 
major limitation of any of these approaches is the degree to which those 
underestimating expenditures are unable to save more or much more than they 
currently do without undesirable tradeoffs, which is likely true for at least part of our 
respondent population. As noted above, we saw a correlation between lower 
estimates and lower income levels, and at least one study suggests that healthcare 
savings incentives have limited effect for some of the population because of income 
constraints.211 Despite such limitations, if targeted efforts to improve financial 
planning for out-of-pocket healthcare spending have some positive effect,212 they 
could reduce unanticipated financial insecurity, especially for particularly vulnerable 
subgroup populations, while also limiting avoidable reliance on healthcare safety 
nets, including Medicaid. 
2. Improving Risk Protection: Implications for Insurance Design and Policy Reforms 
Addressing respondents’ deficiencies in understanding spending uncertainty is 
more complex. Studies have repeatedly shown that individuals systematically 
misperceive risk213 and suggest that risk-education efforts can be an uphill battle.214 
                                                 
209 See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also Lusardi, supra note 15, at 23-26 
(discussing studies showing the effectiveness of default programs for savings, including the lauded 
Save More Tomorrow (SMarT) program devised by Richard Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi that 
increases default savings rates as employees’ income increases).  
210 See Lusardi, supra note 15, at 26-20 (discussing efforts to simplify decisions to save, without 
using strong defaults). 
211 FISHMAN, supra note 5, at ix (reporting the effects incentives programs have on savings for 
low-income populations). 
212 Id.  
213 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 19, at 72 (describing cognitive biases that might produce 
undesirable results even in the face of perfect knowledge); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and 
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 
1051, 1084-85 (2000) (discussing studies showing individual biases in decision-making in the face of 
uncertainty). 
214 See Michael Bond, Risk School, 461 NATURE 1189, 1191 (2009) (describing debate over 
whether people can be taught to understand risk and make well-informed decisions based on it or 
whether it is more appropriate for regulators to guide consumers to better risk decisions through a 
“nudge approach”). But see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 
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Furthermore, for many low- to middle-income Americans, knowledge that they 
might face future healthcare expenditures two or three times higher than median 
expenditures will do little to help them save for expenditures at these levels or to 
obtain sufficient insurance protection, especially in the current insurance 
marketplace. We briefly describe two possible approaches to improve risk protection 
in light of misperceptions of uncertainty.  
a. Low Risk Insurance Policies: Promoting Transparency and Uptake 
To the extent that insurance options that protect against catastrophic spending 
are available and affordable, there may be opportunities to help consumers better 
identify and choose supplemental insurance that offers more protection against 
spending variability.215 A first step would be to increase enrollment among the two-
thirds of the eligible population not enrolled in the Medicare Savings Programs and 
Low-Income Subsidy program for prescription drugs, discussed above, which limit 
Medicare premiums and cost-sharing for lower-income individuals.216  
For others, one starting point might be requiring greater transparency with 
regard to spending variability in insurance options. Individuals must choose among 
Medicare options and supplemental insurance programs without meaningful 
guidance on how different options mitigate the risk of debilitating healthcare 
expenditures in retirement. The menu of choices is overwhelming for even a savvy 
consumer.  
Regulatory reforms could make this choice easier. Insurance regulation requires 
disclosure of certain information, such as deductibles, co-pays, and annual and 
lifetime limits, but does not make transparent residual out-of-pocket payment risks 
that fall to policy holders at different levels of healthcare utilization.217 This means 
that even astute, risk-averse individuals are unable to identify the lowest-risk 
policies. What consumers would need to understand to manage spending risk is the 
range of possible individual costs under various supplemental insurance options. For 
example, supplemental Medigap policies could provide a graph that illustrates the 
total out-of-pocket spending distribution (premiums plus direct costs) among all 
enrollees in a particular plan. The buyer could compare potential spending if he is at 
the twenty-fifth, fiftieth, seventy-fifth, and ninetieth percentile of enrollees in one 
plan against his exposure at the same levels of spending in another. Regulators could 
require the collection of this data and require that insurers disclose it in ways that 
                                                                                                                      
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1206-19 (2003) (describing how understanding the heuristics that people use 
in decision-making can be the basis for policies to help them make better decisions).  
215 See, e.g., On Amir & Orly Lobel, Risk Management for the Future: Age, Risk and Choice 
Architecture 19-23 (July 9, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2102541 (discussing use of choice architecture to 
help especially older people make more future-oriented, less risky choices).  
216 See Dorn & Shang, supra note 38 (discusses strategies for increasing MSP enrollment). 
217 PPACA attempts to address this shortcoming for working-age populations by requiring 
reporting on the actuarial value of policies that will be sold in the new health exchanges; despite good 
intentions, actuarial value may be too complicated a measure for most consumers to translate into 
likely personal spending. See RYAN LORE ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, CHOOSING THE “BEST” 
PLAN IN A HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGE: ACTUARIAL VALUE TELLS ONLY PART OF THE STORY 6 
(2012), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/ 
2012/Aug/1626_Lore_choosing_best_plan_HIE_actuarial_ib_v2.pdf. Also pursuant to PPACA, the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) developed a new form for summaries of 
coverage. See NAIC, SAMPLE COMPLETED SUMMARY OF COVERAGE (2012), available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_b_consumer_information_hhs_dol_submission_1107_soc
_populated.pdf.  
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consumers can reasonably understand. If consumers understood and used this data as 
an important criterion when buying a policy, insurers might offer more policies that 
limit exposure to levels consumers prefer. 
On the other hand, as noted above, work in psychology and behavioral law and 
economics suggests that risk is a concept that is generally not understood, and 
decisions with regard to uncertain future events are particularly prone to cognitive 
error.218 Greater transparency may not increase uptake of lower-risk policies if 
consumers struggle to grasp and systematically underestimate the risk they face 
individually. To promote greater financial security in an uncertain and cognitively 
complex environment, regulatory approaches could guide consumers to adopt 
supplemental policies with more catastrophic risk protection. Medicare has recently 
begun to steer retirees toward higher-rated Medigap policies;219 one could imagine 
using risk protection as a criterion for such steering.  
b. Medicare Policy Reforms 
Alternately, Medicare and supplemental insurance could be redesigned to 
simplify choices and to reduce spending risk across the board, rather than to trying 
shape insurance choices among problematic options. Such an approach would be 
especially attractive to the extent policymakers agree better risk protection would be 
universally beneficial. The EBRI benchmark study projects a 2020 retiree with 
wraparound Medicare (including supplemental Plan F “catastrophic” coverage) will 
spend over $300,000 over retirement if at the ninetieth percentile of spending. 
Getting to these high levels likely requires a combination of many sources of high 
out-of-pocket spending, including Part B, D, and Medigap premiums and significant 
spending on prescription drugs and services not covered by insurance. Few 
Americans, even if armed with perfect information and comprehension of that 
information, could manage such levels of out-of-pocket spending. 
Regulators could redesign basic Medicare or Medigap policies to simplify 
coverage and reduce exposure to high out-of-pocket costs for those with intensive 
medical needs. For example, one proposal for “Medicare Extra” offers a simpler way 
to fill Medicare’s gaps with a single “Medicare E” policy; the authors’ analysis 
suggests their proposed approach would limit exposure with no increase to 
governmental or individual out-of-pocket spending.220 Policies might also trade off a 
degree of first-dollar coverage for more catastrophic protection. Regulators would 
need to tread carefully in this space to avoid the fate of an earlier policy attempt to 
limit catastrophic exposure, the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act, which was 
repealed shortly after passage,221 and to design policies in a way that is neither 
regressive nor detrimental to retirees’ health.222 PPACA directs increased cost-
                                                 
218 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 19, at 72 (describing cognitive biases that might produce 
undesirable results even in the face of perfect knowledge); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 215, at 1091-
92 (describing overconfidence biases).  
219 Marsha Gold, An Illustrative Analysis of Medicare Options Compare: What’s There and 
What’s Not?, 27 INSIGHT ON ISSUES, April 2009, available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ 
health/i27_options.pdf.  
220 See Karen Davis et al., In the Literature: Medicare Extra: A Comprehensive Benefit Option 
for Medicare Beneficiaries, HEALTH AFF. (Oct. 2005), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/ 
2005/11/15/hlthaff.w5.442.short. 
221 See generally Thomas Rice et al., The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act: A Post-Mortem, 9 
HEALTH AFF. 75 (1990) (describing factors that explain the repeal of this Act that attempted to limit the 
catastrophic costs a retiree might face by imposing additional taxes on higher-income elderly). 
222 A study of several Medigap reform proposals that attempt to control the growth in Medicare 
62 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 39 NO. 1 2013 
sharing in Medigap plans to reduce usage of Medicare Part B physician services, 223 
which could offer a window of opportunity to simultaneously strengthen 
catastrophic protection without increasing premiums. In addition, as part of Medigap 
reform, the Simpson-Bowles commission, the Obama Administration, and others 
have proposed simplifying Medicare cost sharing.224 These proposals would all make 
it easier for beneficiaries to navigate Medicare and supplemental coverage options in 
ways that promote their future financial security.  
At the very least, in an environment where we expect individuals to manage 
complex financial planning, policymakers should strive to make it easier—not 
harder—for them to make successful choices. Changes to Medicare and Medicaid 
policy may be necessary in the coming years to stem the increasing share of 
governmental spending on healthcare. Controlling public expenditures on retiree 
healthcare costs is a critical component to restoring balance to federal fiscal policies. 
Many reform proposals contemplate shifting a portion of these costs back to retirees, 
either through reducing the generosity of Medicare payments or scaling back the 
scope of Medicaid support for the elderly. While these proposals are often discussed 
in terms of aggregate deficit reduction or the cost-shifting to typical retirees, 
attention must also be given to the implications of these reforms on the risks 
imposed on individual retirees, especially on those with high individual medical 
costs. Beyond scoring the aggregate financial effects of reforms, policy analysts 
should also take into account the distributional consequences of reform. At a 
minimum, public debate over entitlement reform should be informed through clear 
understanding of the distributional consequences of competing reform proposals on 
a population that may struggle to understand how such reforms could affect their 
future financial security.  
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                      
spending by increasing cost-sharing, with varying limits on total out-of-pocket costs, showed cost reduction 
for most enrollees but cost increases for about 21%, disproportionately affecting those in fair/poor health 
and lower-income enrollees. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDIGAP REFORMS: POTENTIAL EFFECTS 
OF BENEFIT RESTRICTIONS ON MEDICARE SPENDING AND BENEFICIARY COSTS v (2011).  
223 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3210, 124 
Stat. 119, amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 
124 Stat. 1029 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
224 LINEHAN, supra note 55, at 11 (describing proposals from the Simpson-Bowles commission, 
the Congressional Budget Office, and the Obama Administration); see also Amanda Cassidy, Health 
Policy Brief: Putting Limits on ‘Medigap,’ HEALTH AFF. (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.healthaffairs 
.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=52. 
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APPENDIX: SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
The survey instrument had eight sections and three different treatments. Not all 
treatments contained questions from all eight sections or included all available 
questions within each section. All participants received the same introductory 
questions within Section 1. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
basic treatments. Additionally, participants were randomly assigned one of the two 
sets of questions in Section 8. Below is the survey language of Section 1, followed 
by the language used for each treatment from Sections 2-7, and then the language of 
Section 8. Italicized words are explanatory but were not included in the actual 
survey text. Language within brackets refers to conditional questions. 
 
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS 
Introduction 
In this survey, we will be asking about health care costs in retirement. But first 
we want to start with a few questions about your own health and financial planning. 
 
Question 1 
First, how would you characterize your health now?  
Answers: 
1-Excellent 
2-Very Good 
3-Good 
4-Fair 
5-Poor 
Question 2 
Are you familiar with government programs and other insurance plans that 
might cover your health care expenses in retirement (with 10 being extremely 
familiar and 1 being not very familiar)? 
Answers: scale from 1-10 
Question 3 
How much attention do you give to monthly health care costs and other 
expenses (with 10 being a lot of attention and 1 being not very much attention)? 
Answers: scale from 1-10 
Question 4 
Have you ever consulted a financial planner about your retirement? 
Answers: 
1-Yes 
2-No 
3-Don’t Know/Can’t Remember 
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TREATMENT A  
SECTION 2: INSURANCE COVERAGE 
Introduction 
In this survey, we want to find out how much you expect to pay for health care 
in retirement. We are interested in your out-of-pocket costs. Out-of-pocket costs are 
any expenses that you pay yourself. In addition to any direct payments, these costs 
include insurance premiums for government programs and other health insurance 
plans. Out-of-pocket costs also cover deductibles and co-pays. Out-of-pocket costs 
do not include payments made on your behalf or reimbursed by government 
programs or other insurance plans. In all cases, we are asking about your own 
personal health care costs in retirement. Do not include health care costs of other 
members of your household. Unless otherwise indicated, please do not include in 
your estimates the cost of long-term residential health-care services (such as 
extended stays in nursing homes) or premiums for long-term health care insurance. 
Some questions ask for estimates about costs in the future. Please do not attempt to 
adjust your estimates to reflect price increases from overall inflation. Just make your 
estimates using the value of money today. 
SECTION 3: LIFE EXPECTANCY 
Introduction 
Planning for retirement is hard because we do not know how long we will live. 
We would now like to get a better sense of how you think about your own life 
expectancy. We would like to know how likely you think it is that you will live 
beyond certain ages. If you are very confident you will live beyond a certain age, 
you should click on the right side of the ruler, towards the upper end of the range. If 
you are less confident you will live beyond the age, you should click on the left side 
of the ruler and the lower end of the range.  
 
Question 1 [asked if age < 65] 
How likely do you think it is that you will live beyond the age of 65? 
Answer choices: probability range from 1 to 100 
Question 2 [asked if age < 75] 
How likely do you think it is that you will live beyond the age of 75? 
Answer choices: probability range from 1 to 100 
Question 3 [asked if age < 85] 
How likely do you think it is that you will live beyond the age of 85? 
Answer choices: probability range from 1 to 100 
Question 4 [asked if age < 95] 
How likely do you think it is that you will live beyond the age of 95? 
Answer choices: probability range from 1 to 100 
Question 5 [asked if age < 105] 
How likely do you think it is that you will live beyond the age of 105? 
Answer choices: probability range from 1 to 100 
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SECTION 5: OUT-OF-POCKET COST EXPECTATIONS 
Introduction 
For the next questions, we would like you to estimate your total monthly out-of-
pocket costs in retirement. Your estimates should include all premiums for any 
government programs or health care insurance plans. You should also include other 
out-of-pocket costs for health care expenses that you pay directly. Recognizing that 
these expenses may vary from month to month, please estimate your average 
monthly expenses. 
 
Question 1 
What do you expect your total monthly out-of-pocket costs to be on average? 
Please give your response in terms of dollars per month. 
Answer choices: any number 
Question 2 
It may be hard to think about this, but during the final year of your life, what do 
you expect your total monthly out-of-pocket costs to be on average? Please give 
your response in terms of dollars per month. 
Answer choices: any number 
SECTION 6: LUMP SUM ESTIMATES 
Question 1 
In planning for retirement, some individuals like to think in terms of how much 
money they would need to save by the time they turn 65 in order to have enough 
money to cover out-of-pocket costs in retirement. Imagine that you were asked to 
give advice to someone with similar preferences and health characteristics as your 
own. If such a person wanted to have enough money to cover a reasonable estimate 
of their total out-of-pocket costs for health care in retirement, how much do you 
think they would need to have set aside? Please give your answer in terms of the 
total amount of dollars needed at age 65. 
Answer choices: any number  
[If the answer given was less than $1,000, the survey displayed the following 
prompt: 
Are you sure savings of only ____ at 65 would be enough to cover out-of-pocket 
costs in retirement? Please go back and check your answer.] 
SECTION 7: LONG-TERM CARE 
Introduction 
The following questions concern the costs of long-term residential health care 
services, such as nursing home care or an assisted living facility. Long-term 
residential health care services include extended stays in nursing homes or assisted 
living facilities and also extended assistance with activities of daily living (eating, 
dressing or bathing) at home by home health aides. 
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Question 1 
If you were to maintain a separate insurance policy for long-term residential 
health care services in retirement, how much do you think the policy would cost for 
someone like you? Please give your estimate in terms of dollars for a monthly 
premium. 
Answer choices: any number 
Question 2 
If you were not to maintain a separate insurance policy for long-term residential 
health care services, how much would you expect your out-of-pocket costs to be for 
a month of residential nursing home care? 
Answer choices: any number 
SECTION 8A: RISK FACTORS – INSURANCE 
Introduction 
In this final set of questions, we ask you to consider several factors that might 
increase your out-of-pocket costs for health care in retirement and to consider how 
much you would be willing to pay each month in order to eliminate these risks. 
 
Question 1 
Research suggests that health care expenses in retirement can vary considerably 
from individual to individual based on differences in the health of individuals and 
their medical needs. As a result, out-of-pocket costs for some individuals can be 
much higher than those of the average retiree. How much would you be willing to 
pay each month for an insurance policy that fully protected you from incurring out-
of-pocket costs higher than those of the average retiree, regardless of your own 
health or medical needs? 
Question 2 
In recent years, health care costs have increased faster than the overall rate of 
inflation, and some have expressed concern that health care costs may continue to 
increase faster than overall inflation. How much would you be willing to pay each 
month for an insurance policy that fully protected you against any unexpected 
acceleration in the rate of inflation of health care costs? 
Question 3 
In recent years, policy analysts have been discussing whether changes in 
Medicare and other government programs will be necessary to address the problems 
of federal government deficits. Some have expressed concern that such changes 
could reduce government support for retiree health care and increase the amount that 
retirees must themselves pay for health care costs. How much would you be willing 
to pay each month for an insurance policy that fully protected you from incurring 
additional out-of-pocket costs as a result of any changes in Medicare or other 
government programs? 
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SECTION 8B: RISK FACTORS – QUALITATIVE 
Introduction 
In this final set of questions, we ask you to consider various factors that might 
increase your out-of-pocket costs for health care in retirement. 
 
Question 1 
Research suggests that health care expenses in retirement can vary from 
individual to individual based on differences in the health of individuals and their 
medical needs. How concerned are you that your own out-of-pocket costs might be 
higher than average based on your own health and medical needs? 
Answer choices: 
1-Not concerned at all 
2-A little concerned 
3-Quite concerned 
4-Extremely concerned 
Question 2 
If your personal health care expenses in retirement do end up being higher than 
average as a result of your own health and medical needs, how much more do you 
think would you need to budget to be highly confident that you would have enough 
to cover your out-of-pocket costs? 
Answer choices:  
1-A little more (less than 5 percent) 
2-A reasonable amount more (5 to 25 percent) 
3-A substantial amount more (25 to 50 percent) 
4-A large amount more (50 to 100 percent) 
5-An extremely large amount more (over 100 percent) 
Question 3 
In recent years, the price of health care has increased faster than the overall rate 
of inflation, and some have expressed concern that the price of health care may 
continue to increase faster than overall inflation. How concerned are you that faster 
rates of inflation for the price of health care will increase your out-of-pocket costs in 
retirement? 
Answer choices:  
1-Not concerned at all 
2-A little concerned 
3-Quite concerned 
4-Extremely concerned 
Question 4 
In the event that the price of health care does rise faster than overall inflation, 
how much more do you think you would need to budget to be highly confident that 
you would have enough to cover your out-of-pocket costs in retirement?  
Answer choices: 
1-A little more (less than 5 percent) 
2-A reasonable amount more (5 to 25 percent) 
3-A substantial amount more (25 to 50 percent) 
4-A large amount more (50 to 100 percent) 
5-An extremely large amount more (over 100 percent) 
Question 5 
In recent years, policy analysts have been discussing whether changes in 
Medicare and other government programs will be necessary to address the problems 
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of federal government deficits. Some have expressed concern that such changes 
could reduce government support for retiree health care and increase the amount that 
retirees must themselves pay for health care costs. How concerned are you that such 
changes might increase your out-of-pocket costs in retirement? 
Answer choices: 
1-Not concerned at all 
2-A little concerned 
3-Quite concerned 
4-Extremely concerned 
Question 6 
If government support for retiree health care is reduced in coming years, how 
much more do you think you would need to budget to be highly confident that you 
would have enough to cover your out-of-pocket costs in retirement? 
Answer choices: 
1-A little more (less than 5 percent) 
2-A reasonable amount more (5 to 25 percent) 
3-A substantial amount more (25 to 50 percent) 
4-A large amount more (50 to 100 percent) 
5-An extremely large amount more (over 100 percent) 
 
TREATMENT B [Same as Treatment A, but with these Additional Questions] 
SECTION 2: INSURANCE COVERAGE 
 
Question 1 
Do you expect to be covered by Medicare in retirement? 
Answer choices: percentage range from 0-100 
[If the answer chosen was greater than zero, the survey displayed the following 
questions]: 
As you may know, Medicare offers two forms of basic health care coverage for 
most Americans over the age of 65: Traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage. 
In addition, several years ago a new Medicare Part D Prescription Drug coverage 
became available. If you were to maintain Medicare coverage in retirement, which 
form of basic health care coverage would you expect to elect:  
Answer choices: 
1-Traditional Medicare Coverage 
2-Medicare Advantage Coverage 
3-Don’t Know or Haven’t Decided 
Would you expect to add Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Coverage? 
Answer choices: 
1-Yes 
2-No 
3-Don’t Know or Haven’t Decided 
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Question 2 
Beyond Medicare, do you expect to be covered by an Employer Sponsored 
Retiree Health Care Policy in retirement? 
Answer choices: percentage range from 0-100 
Question 3 
Beyond Medicare, do you expect to be covered by a Medigap Supplement 
Insurance Policy in retirement other than one sponsored by a former employer? 
Answer choices: percentage range from 0-100 
Question 4 
Do you expect to be covered by Medicaid in retirement? 
Answer choices: percentage range from 0-100 
Question 5 
Do you expect to be covered by Veterans Administration health care benefits in 
retirement? 
Answer choices: percentage range from 0-100 
SECTION 4: MONTHLY PREMIUM COST EXPECTATIONS 
 
Question 1 
As you may know, Medicare beneficiaries are required to pay monthly 
premiums for various kinds of coverage. If you were to maintain Medicare coverage, 
how much would you expect your total monthly Medicare premiums to be during 
your retirement years? Please give your response in terms of dollars per month. 
(please round up to the nearest dollar) 
Answer choices: any number 
Question 2 [asked if likelihood of having Employer Sponsored Retiree Health 
Care coverage > 0] 
In response to a previous question, you indicated that you might have Employer 
Sponsored Retiree Health Care coverage in retirement. As you may know, some 
Employer Sponsored Retiree Health Care coverage requires participants to pay 
monthly premiums. If you do maintain Employer Sponsored Retiree Health Care 
coverage in retirement, how much do you expect your monthly premiums to be for 
this coverage? Please give your response in terms of dollars per month. 
Answer choices: any number 
Question 3 [asked if likelihood of having Medigap coverage > 0] 
In response to a previous question, you indicated that you might have Medigap 
Supplement Insurance coverage in retirement. If you do maintain Medigap 
Supplement Insurance coverage in retirement, how much do you expect your 
monthly premiums to be for this coverage? Please give your response in terms of 
dollars per month. 
Answer choices: any number 
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SECTION 5: OUT-OF-POCKET COST EXPECTATIONS 
Introduction 
For the next questions, we would like you to estimate your total monthly out-of-
pocket costs for health care expenses at various times in retirement. Your estimates 
should include all premiums for any government programs or health care insurance 
plans. You should also include other out-of-pocket costs for health care expenses 
that you pay directly. Recognizing that these expenses may vary from month to 
month, please estimate your average monthly expenses. 
 
Question 1 [asked if age < 65] 
When you are 65, what do you expect your total monthly out-of-pocket costs for 
health care expenses to be on average? Please give your response in terms of dollars 
per month. 
Answer choices: any number 
[If respondent was 65 years old or older, the survey displayed the following 
question instead: 
Since you turned 65, what would you estimate your total monthly out-of-pocket 
costs for health care expenses have been on average? Please give your response in 
terms of dollars per month. 
Answer choices: any number] 
Question 2 [asked if age < 75] 
When you are 75, what do you expect your total monthly out-of-pocket costs for 
health care expenses to be on average? Please give your response in terms of dollars 
per month. 
Answer choices: any number 
Question 3 [asked if age < 85] 
When you are 85, what do you expect your total monthly out-of-pocket costs for 
health care expenses to be on average? Please give your response in terms of dollars 
per month. 
Answer choices: any number 
Question 4 
It may be hard to think about this, but during the final year of your life, what do 
you expect your total monthly out-of-pocket costs to be on average? Please give 
your response in terms of dollars per month. 
Answer choices: any number 
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TREATMENT C [Same as Treatment B, but with Revised Anchoring 
Information] 
SECTION 3: LIFE EXPECTANCY 
Introduction 
Planning for retirement is hard because we do not know how long we will live. 
According to experts, American men who turn 65 today are projected to live a bit 
over 17 more years on average and women turning 65 are projected to live another 
20 years on average. We would now like to get a better sense of how you think about 
your own life expectancy. We would like to know how likely you think it is that you 
will live beyond certain ages. If you are very confident you will live beyond a 
certain age, you should click on the right side of the ruler towards the upper end of 
the range. If you are less confident you will live beyond the age, you should click on 
the left side of the ruler and the lower end of the range. 
SECTION 4: MONTHLY PREMIUM COST EXPECTATIONS 
Question 1 
As you may know, Medicare beneficiaries are required to pay monthly 
premiums for their coverage. Currently, monthly premiums for traditional Medicare 
coverage range from $95 to $115 a month depending on the year individuals started 
receiving coverage. Individuals with annual incomes over $85,000 and families with 
incomes over $170,000 pay higher monthly premiums for traditional Medicare 
coverage, with premiums ranging from $160 to $370 a month. Medicare Part D 
Prescription Drug coverage is additional and Part D premiums average about $40 a 
month. For those participating in Medicare Advantage coverage, which usually 
includes its own prescription drug benefits, monthly premiums range are about the 
same as those for participants in traditional Medicare and Part D Prescription Drug 
programs. Medicare Advantage participants do, however, sometimes receive a 
premium rebate, which in recent years has averaged $20 a month, and also generally 
pay lower out-of-pocket expenses than participants in traditional Medicare. If you 
were to maintain Medicare coverage, how much do you expect your total monthly 
Medicare premiums to be during your retirement years? Please give your response in 
terms of dollars per month. 
Question 2 [asked if likelihood of having Employer Sponsored Retiree Health 
Care coverage > 0] 
In response to a previous question, you indicated that you might have Employer 
Sponsored Retiree Health Care coverage in retirement. As you may know, some 
Employer Sponsored Retiree Health Care coverage requires participants to pay 
monthly premiums. The average monthly premium cost for Employer Sponsored 
Retiree Health Care coverage is about $165 a month for a retiree aged 65 or older 
and $330 a month for a retiree younger than age 65. If you do maintain Employer 
Sponsored Retiree Health Care coverage in retirement, how much do you expect 
your monthly premiums to be for this coverage? Please give your response in terms 
of dollars per month. 
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Question 3 [asked if likelihood of having Medigap coverage > 0] 
In response to a previous question, you indicated that you might have Medigap 
Supplement Insurance coverage in retirement. As you may know, pricing for 
Medigap Supplemental Insurance premiums vary considerably by state and by terms 
of coverage, with monthly premiums ranging from less than $50 to over $200, with 
some forms of coverage reaching monthly premiums of $500 or more. If you do 
maintain Medigap Supplement Insurance coverage in retirement, how much do you 
expect your monthly premiums to be for this coverage? 
SECTION 5: OUT-OF-POCKET COST EXPECTATIONS 
Introduction 
For the next questions, we would like you to estimate your total monthly out-of-
pocket costs at various times in retirement. Your estimates should include all 
premiums for any government programs or health care insurance plans. You should 
also include other out-of-pocket costs for health care expenses that you pay directly. 
As a rule of thumb, insurance premiums typically constitute between forty and sixty 
percent of total out-of-pocket costs. As you may know, the cost of health care has 
risen faster than overall inflation over the past few decades, and government experts 
predict that retiree health care costs will rise more than one percentage point faster 
than overall inflation in coming years. If that prediction is accurate, the real costs of 
retiree health care would increase by more than ten percent every decade. 
Recognizing that these expenses may vary from month to month, please estimate 
your average monthly expenses for health care at various times during your 
retirement years. 
 
 
 
 
 
